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INTRODUCTION 
Sartre's study L'Idiot de la fam111e is an attempt to answer the 
question he posed in the Preface: "What can one know of a man today?" 
It represents the culmination of Sartre's -life's work and contains 
traces of his diverse preoccupations, all of which may be seen to 
revolve around the central one of communicating the essence of man. 
L'Idiot de 1 a familie is in three volumes, and covers the life of 
Gustave Flaubert up to the publication of Madame Bovary. (The fourth 
volume, which would have been a literary analysis of Madame Bovary on 
structuralist lines, was abandoned when Sartre's sight failed.) The 
first two volumes are divided into three main parts, covering Flaubert's 
childhood, his adolescence and the Pont L'Ev§que crisis. They also 
contain a number of analyses which do not directly concern Flaubert, 
including boredom, laughter, stupidity, dreaming, the imaginary and 
language. Volumes I and II demonstrate an application of the type of 
literary Freudian psychoanalysis pioneered by Marie Bonaparte in her work 
on Edgar Allan Poe. They also give expression to Sartre's views on 
language and literature, as well as emphasising his individualist 
philosophy. The third volume is an attempt to show that Flaubert's 
neurosis was part of the neurosis of the times, by comparing it with 
other writers' attitudes; for example, there is a lengthy discussion 
of the life of Leconte de Lisle. It is in this volume that some critics 
feel Sartre comes closest to giving a Marxist analysis of the social 
structure of the society in which Flaubert lived. 
The idea for what eventually become L'Idiot de la familie was first 
suggested in about 1954 by Roger Garaudy. Garaudy, a leading intellectual 
in the French Communist Party, proposed to Sartre that they undertake to 
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study a man, he through Marxist methodology and Sartre through exist-
entialism. The subject and the title of the work were soon chosen. 
However, although Sartre began writing with great enthusiasm, the 
project failed to come to fruition. This did not prevent Sartre, whose 
intellectual preoccupation with Flaubert had already been demonstrated in 
L'§tre et le ngant and in Qu'est-ce que la 1ittgrature?, from continuing 
to pursue this interest, and from linking it with his numerous contemporary 
concerns. These included Marxism, the position of the Communist Party, the 
New Novel, psychoanalysis, the Algerian war, the conferring of honours 
and the freedom of the individual. 
1 
According to Iris Murdoch , Sartre is a philosopher whose interests 
span three post-Hegelian movements of thought: the Marxist, the exist-
entialist and the phenomenological. With Marxism, Sartre shared a passion 
for action, and to a certain extent he used its analytical method. From 
Kierkegaard's existentialism, he took the picture of man as a lonely, 
anguished being, but he rejected the hidden Kierkegaardian God. In his 
philosophy, in an attempt to define 'human reality', Sartre used a notion 
of consciousness derived from a Husserlian vocabulary, which he combined 
with psychological insights suggested by Freud. Furthermore, an anti-
Cartesian attack on the mind-body dualism is matched with a Cartesian 
insistence upon the authority of consciousness in determining its own 
significance. One is also aware of the influence of both Nietzsche and 
Schopenhauer on Sartre's writings. Sartre rarely acknowledged the sources 
of his ideas, but Aron has pointed to similarities between Sartre's work 
and that of the German sociologists. He noted in particular that "Sartrean 
1 Iris Murdoch, Sartre; romantic rationalist, London, Bowes and Bowes, 
1953, p. 7. ~ 
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consciousness encompasses the goal-directed rationality of Weber at 
the same time as the 'lived experience' of Dilthey".^ 
In an interview®, Sartre said that in order to discuss Flaubert, he 
had to write about the dialectic: "La preuve c'est que, dans 1'article 
polonais'', je n'ai pas pu m'emp§cher de parler de lui et, inversement, 
que j'ai transports dans Critique de la raison dialectique de longs 
passages que j'avais mis dans mon livre sur lui." The Critique de la 
raison dialectique was thus a necessary prelude to L'Idiot de la fami1le. 
On a theoretical level, the Critique was an attempt to recapture man 
inside Marxism, and to show that although Marxism might prove the best 
framework for looking at society, its analytical method was useless for 
investigating the essence of man. The Critique provided an exposition 
of Sartre's world view and this exposition allowed him to complete a 
study which 'n'aura pas besoin de bandage herniaire'^. 
In Question de mgthode, Sartre set out the methodology which he 
intended to use in his study. He summarised it as follows: 
"La mSthode marxiste est progressive parce qu'elle est le 
rSsultat de longues analyses . . . Notre mSthode est euristique, 
elle nous apprend du neuf parce qu'elle est regressive et 
progressive tout ^ la fois. Son premier soin est, comme celui 
du marxiste, de replacer 1'homme dans son cadre . . . La 
m^thode existentialiste veut rester euristique. Elle n'aura 
d'autre moyen que le 'va-et-vient': elle dSterminera 
progressivement la biographie en approfondissant I'^poque, 
2 Raymond Aron, History and the dialectic of violence, Oxford, Blackwell, 
1975, p. 8. 
3 J.-P. Sartre, "Les dcrivains en personne", in Situations IX, Paris, 
Gallimard, 1972. 
4 Published in a revised form as Question de mgthode, the prefatory essay 
to Critique de la raison dialectique. 
5 Les gcrivains en personne, p. 12. 
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et I'gpoque en approfondissant la biographie. Loin de chercher 
sur-le-champ ^ int^grer T u n e ^ T autre, elle les maintiendra 
s^par^es jusqu'^ ce que 1'enveloppement r^ciproque se fasse de 
lui-m§me et mette un terme provisoire ^ la recherche."® 
The method is very reminiscent of that used by Freud, with whose 
work Sartre had become acquainted through The psychopathology of everyday 
1ife. Like the majority of Frenchmen, Sartre felt a repugnance for 
psychoanalysis; having been educated in the Cartesian tradition, he 
was shocked by the very idea of the unconscious, and perturbed by the 
ambiguity of the terminology used. However, a closer examination of 
Freud's writings showed him that 
"La pens^e de Freud et celle de Marx sont toutes deux des 
theories du conditionnement ext^rieur. Quand Marx dit: 'Peu 
importe ce que la bourgeoisie croit faire, 1'important c'est 
ce qu'elle fait; il suffit de remplacer 'la bourgeoisie' par 
'un hyst^rique' pour que la formule puisse §tre de Freud. 
In Question de methode^, Sartre wrote that only psychoanalysis could 
enable us to study the process by which a child, groping in the dark, 
is going to attempt to play, without understandim it, the social role 
which adults impose on him. Sartre's use of psychoanalysis would not be 
totally Freudian, however, because he regarded the theory of Freudian 
psychoanalysis as 'soft thought', with no dialectical logic to it^. 
His views on the value of psychoanalysis were further modified. Whilst 
working on L'Idiot de la famille, Sartre became acquainted with the work 
of Bruno Bettelheim on autistic children^®. He accepted Bettelheim's 
6 J-P. Sartre, Question de mgthode, pp.86-87. 
7 J-P. Sartre, "Sartre par Sartre", in Situations IX, pp. 103-104. 
8 Question de mgthode, p. 46. 
9 Sartre par Sartre, p. 107. 
10 This was mentioned by Simone de Beauvoir in her autobiography. I quote 
from memory. 
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proposition that children could be affected by attitudes towards them 
from birth; that there was no such time as an age of innocence; and 
that infants could also act on their surroundings. 
In his theoretical works, Sartre had often expressed the desire to 
lay the political foundations of anthropology - the study of man. In 
Question de mgthode, he proposed an anthropology which would serve as a 
tool in the development of Marxism, by combining Freudian and existential 
insights with Marxist methodology. In an interview, he formulated the 
important aspect of the study of man: 
"What is essential is not what one has made of man, but what 
he has made of what one has made of him. What one has made 
of man are the structures, the signifying wholes, studied by 
the human sciences. What he makes is history itself, the 
actual surpassing of these structures in a totalising 
praxis. Philosophy is situated at the juncture . . . The 
philosopher is the one who attempts to think this surpassing." ^ ^ 
Sartre's regressive-progressive method was open to criticism on a 
number of levels. Because of its acceptance of the partial validity of 
Freudian psychoanalysis as a method of investigation, he could not 
expect the method to be accepted as neo-Marxist by members of the 
Communist Party, since the Communist Party disavowed the work of Freud, 
in favour of Pavlovian psychology. L^vi-Strauss, whose Marxist-based 
Structuralism was a rival method of investigation, pointed out that it is 
false to claim the regressive-progressive method as new, even in the human 
sciences, since in fact it is the method anthropologists have been applying 
1 2 
for years . Indeed, Sartre's methodology shows traces of both Marxist and 
11 "J-P. Sartre rgpond", no. 30, 1966. 
12 Claude Ldvi-Strauss, The savage mind, London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1972, Chapter 9. 
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non-Marxist thought, and reflects the problem with which he had wrestled 
for years: 
"Nous ^tions convaincus en m§me temps que le materialisme 
historique fournissait la seule interprdtation valable de 
I'histoire et que 1'existentialisme restait la seule approche 
concrete de la realit^."^^ 
The relationship between men plays a very important part in L'Idiot 
de la fami lie. Sartre laid the groundwork for a discussion of this in 
L'etre et le neant and in Critique de la raison dialectique. He 
regarded all relationships as mediated by a third party, which may be 
seen as matter, but which can also be that part of man which belongs to 
the social order. He is not only concerned with the construction of 
social relations, but also with the causes of alienation. He contended 
that alienation occurred when the mediated relationship was not transcended, 
Alienation may also occur when a dominant partner in a relationship 
dehumanises himself to be able to cope with the humiliating of the 
other - in other words, when he does not have the courage to be proud 
of the evil and suffering he causes. On the other hand, the relationship 
can be transcended by the oppressed party: Sartre maintained that the 
oppressed person is in a position to interiorise the values of his 
oppressor to the point where those values become a weapon. Balandier 
has drawn perhaps unjustified attention to this by naming it the theory 
of negritude and proposing it as the basis of Sartre's anthropological 
studies and the foundation of a political anthropology.^'' 
13 Question de methode, p. 24. 
14 Georges Balandier, Political anthropology, London, Allen Lane, 
1970, p. 185. 
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Human relations are bonded by language, "[le mot] transporte en 
moi les projets de 1'autre et dans 1'Autre mes propres projets. 11 
n'est pas douteux qu'on pourrait ^tudier le- langage de la m§me fa?on 
que la monnaie: comme materiality circulante, inerte, unifiant des 
dispersions."^^ Taking the notion that language is matter, Sartre 
claims that man is inside language, and on the basis of this formulation 
he states that one can know something of a writer's relationship with 
his society by studying in his writing his use of language. 
Sartre's preoccupation with literature and the use of language is 
obvious in L'Idiot de la famille. Qu'est-ce que la littgrature? set out 
in forceful terms his belief in a committed literature, a belief which 
was recognisably Marxist-Leninist. He considered prose the only 
acceptable literature; prose writing represented communication and 
therefore action. At the time of the publication of Qu'est-ce que la 
1ittgrature?, he accepted the commitment of the poet to write, but only 
because man is free to choose his own future, and denigrated the poet's 
project by regarding it a commitment to failure^^. In L'Idiot de la 
familie, a man's commitment to poetry or Art becomes the only valid 
project in certain circumstances. Although Sartre's view of the novelist 
has been modified over the years, his views on the novel have varied 
little. The novel, as he explained in the Preface to Nathalie Sarraute's 
Portrait d'un inconnu, should seek the truth of the situation, without 
the perspective of the omniscient narrator. This was the approach he 
was to adopt in L'Idiot de la familie, which he regarded among other 
things, as an attempt to create a novel. 
15 Critique, p. 180. 
16 J.-P. Sartre, "Qu'est-ce que la 1itt^rature?" in Situations II, Paris, 
Gallimard, 1948, p. 85, n. 4. 
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Sartre claimed that L' Idiot de la famHle was a fictional work. 
It can be seen to conform in some ways to his definition of the novel. 
He had attempted in the past to construct works of the imagination, 
so that events portrayed formed a whole, whose meaning was intelligible 
when the totality was achieved. However, in his fictional writing, 
Sartre had found himself unable to do justice to the complexities 
of lived experience. He therefore turned to biography, as a more 
adequate form in which to unify the various isolated and inter-
connecting dimensions of a given life in order to produce a fictional 
work. L'Idiot de la fami lie is an example of such an attempt. It 
does not read as a conventional biography. Its disregard of chronology 
is based both on Sartre's view of the novelistic experience, and also 
on his view of history - since his subject is dead and events cannot 
be altered, it makes no difference at which point one enters the life, 
nor in which order the events are recounted^ 
Imagination and the imaginary have played an important part in 
Sartre's philosophical universe. His theory of the imagination is set 
out in one of his earliest works, L'Imaginaire, where he posited 
imagination as a mode of consciousness, and even an essential structure 
of consciousness. Sartre described two distinct mental functions, 
perceiving and imagining. Memory, perception and anticipation are 
addressed to the real, past, present and future. Imagination introduces 
the unreal, is timeless and allows man to act in the imagined world on 
actions committed in the real world. Barnes^® comments that without 
the possibility of imagining - i.e. creating the unreal - a man would 
be wholly engulfed, swallowed up in the real. In L'Idiot de la famille, 
17 J-P. Sartre, Les mots, Paris, Gallimard, 1964, p. 168. 
18 Hazel Barnes, Sartre, London, Quartet, 1974, p. 69. 
- 9 -
Sartre examined Flaubert's dealings with society as an escape into the 
unreal. He admitted that certain aspects of the life of Flaubert as he 
depicted them were the product of his own imagination. In fact, 
imagination and Sartre's theory of the imaginary are the touchstone 
of the work. 
Sartre employs a variety of approaches in his investigation of the 
question: 'What can one know of a man today?' Each approach will tell 
the reader something more about Flaubert, the obvious 'man' of the 
question. Each approach will also tell something about another man -
the man who formulated the study, asked the questions and suggested the 
answers. Sartre acknowledges the ambiguity of his question and gives 
the perspicacious reader revealing glimpses of his own inner self. The 
book reads like a detective's notebook. Perhaps one could say that, 
after reading L'Idiot de la fami lie, one knows almost everything about 
the subject under investigation, and about the investigator. This is 
possible because throughout L'Idiot de la famille, Sartre is concerned 
with a tenuous pattern formed by the tension between the real and the 
imaginary, and Flaubert's perception of himself within this pattern. 
The reader becomes aware of a superimposed and even more tenuous pattern, 
the tension between Sartre's perception of himself and his imagining of 
Flaubert. 
Sartre has mentioned that he, like many other writers, was fascinated 
by Kafka's Metamorphosis. Like L'Idiot de 1a fami lie, this is a multi-
faceted work. Sartre took one aspect of Metamorphosis and used it to 
express the oppressive father/son relationship, existing between 
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Achille-Cl^ophas and Gustave Flaubert, for he saw Kafka's story as the 
supreme literary example, in the twentieth century, of this phenomenon. 
Another aspect of Metamorphosis which has fascinated Sartre is the idea 
of a change in the body, whether actual or imagined. In La nausge, for 
example, this was a major theme. The transformation from one state to 
another, as if by magic, is at the centre of Sartre's theory of the 
imaginary. Yet perhaps the most striking exposition of the idea of the 
Metamorphosis is to be found in L'Idiot de 1a fami11e. Here the reader 
is confronted with continual changes of state. The facts around which 
the study is built are now verifiable, now pure imagination. The 
methodology is now identifiably Marxist, now would-be Marxist; now 
Freudian, now would-be Freudian. The most amazing change of state, 
however, is that which the central figure undergoes - he is now Flaubert, 
now Sartre, now fragments of both. Refraction and metamorphoses interact 
and play on the central theme of the work - the essence of a man, high-
lighting both Sartre and Flaubert, separating their identities and fusing 
them. 
This study regards L'Idiot de la famil1e as a prismatic work. Sartre 
has taken several approaches in his investigation, each of which fulfils 
the function of a single facet in the prism. The approaches are often 
difficult to disentangle; each is constructed from the same type of 
facts as the others, that is to say objective or verifiable facts, facts 
taken from Flaubert's writings, and facts imagined by Sartre; each is 
subjected to the same methodological investigations, Marxist, Freudian 
and Sartrean. The approaches represent a series of inter-related attempts 
to answer the same question. Each may also be seen as a search for 
identity or authenticity. 
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Each facet of the prism will be dealt with in a separate chapter 
of this study. The first, entitled 'Man in society' will consider 
L'Idiot de 1a famille as an example of Sartre's 'anthropological' 
writings. 'The solitary individual' will show Sartre's work as an 
investigation of the self and the search for identity both in the 
real or political world and in the symbolic or imagined world. The 
chapter regarding the third facet, 'The theft of language', considers 
Sartre's interest in the use of language. The fifth chapter, 'A crime 
committed against whom?', takes its title in part from Sartre's 
assertion (related to the content of chapter four) that Flaubert 
stole language from men, and also from his insistence that a good 
novel should read like a detective story. 'A crime committed against 
whom?' discusses Sartre's view of the novel and his comments on the 
novelist as put forward in L'Idiot de la famille. The last two chapters 
regard L'Idiot de la famille as a biography, and present the two faces 
of biography. 'A man imagined?' examines theories of biography and 
takes Flaubert as the central figure. 'A man perceived?' considers 
L'Idiot de la famille as a study of Sartre himself. 
This prismatic work has a special quality - the stuff of which the 
prism itself is made. It derives from Sartre's theory of the imaginary 
as set out in L'Imaginaire. Through the example of an impersonation, 
Sartre shows how perception and imagination may inter-relate to produce 
a 'hybrid condition' where both faculties are used simultaneously. 
Throughout the work, the reader is constantly aware of the fact that 
Sartre constructs the real from the imagined and the imagined from the 
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real. The way in which he achieves this construction is only apparent 
after the reader has finished the lengthy work and pondered on its 
intrigue. 
I shall examine each of the facets of L'Idiot de la famille in terms 
of the mainstream theories in the disciplines which each chapter brings 
to bear on the facets of Sartre's work. This examination is intended to 
demonstrate that Sartre's study is successful to a greater or lesser degree 
on all levels, provided the reader is mindful of the work's dependence on 
the theory of the imaginary. I hope to demonstrate not only that the 
intricate construction of L'Idiot de la famille is an intellectual tour 
de force, but also that each facet of the work sheds light on Sartre's 
ultimate answer to his question: "What can one know of a man today?" 
IN SOCIETY; L'IDIOT DE LA FAMILLE AS 
AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY 
Throughout his long career, Jean-Paul-Sartre has continually reminded 
us of his interest in anthropology, and of his desire to found a science 
of man, which would be historical and structural. L'Idiot de la fami lie 
is an example of the application of his own method of investigation, 
L'Idiot de la famille can be evaluated by comparison with the mainstream 
theories of contemporary anthropology. Sartre's study may be viewed as 
an attempt to unite two distinct trends in anthropological investigation: 
the type of social anthropology predominant in Britain and Europe, known as 
Structural Anthropology, whose major proponent is Claude Ldvi-Strauss; and 
the cultural anthropology favoured by many American scholars, among whom 
Robert Redfield is a respected figure. In other words, it may be viewed 
as an attempt to present an analysis of the structure and content of the 
society in which Flaubert lived. 
T. H. Adamowski, reviewing L'Idiot de la fami lie, placed the work in 
an anthropological context by drawing a parallel between Sartre's writings 
and those of Claude L^vi-Strauss. He commented that^ L'Idiot de la familie 
was one in a line of Sartrean 'mythologiques'^ which began in 1946 with 
Baudelaire; these studies sought to answer the question: "What can we know 
of a man today?" 
1 T. H. Adamowski, 'The condemned of Rouen: Sartre's Flaubert', in Novel, 
vol. 6, no. 1, Fall 1972, pp. 79-83. 
2 L^vi-Strauss has produced a four-volume work, with the overall title 
'Mythologiques'. The English translation of this is 'The science of 
mythology.' The phrase explains L^vi-Strauss's approach to the study 
of myths through these four books. 
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It is necessary to emphasise the common factors between L^vi-Strauss 
and Sartre, to show that Sartre and modern anthropology share the same 
concerns, and that much of Sartre's analysis fits an anthropological 
pattern, although the models studied may be unusual. The following passage 
describes the correspondence between L6vi-Strauss and Sartre: 
"At different times and in different places, both men have 
turned their attention to such questions as the relative 
centrality of the dialectic and analytic frames of 
investigation; the mechanics through which the distinctive 
features of a social and conceptual reality become cohesively 
integrated; the extent to which the thoughts and actions of a 
free man are constrained by the structures of his mind, his 
society and his physical environment; the ways in which 
language, social relations and alternative forms of logic 
reflect and bound the process of thought itself; and the 
question to what extent history may be regarded as a unique 
verification of fundamental principles of human existence 
rather than merely being one more expression of the 
structural regularities that pervade all of the human 
career. 
Whilst Sartre wanted a study which would cover all the aspects of 
a society, both structurally and culturally, L^vi-Strauss concentrated on 
the structuralist approach. After the publication of Critique de la raison 
dialectique, in 1960, the differences in approach to the study of man between 
Sartre and Ldvi-Strauss became the centre of continuing debate. In The 
savage m i n d , L^vi-Strauss devoted the final chapter to 'History and dialectic', 
Here, he took Sartre to task over theoretical inconsistencies in the Critique, 
which revolved around Sartre's definition of the terms 'dialectical reason' 
and 'history'. Whereas he himself saw the term dialectical reason as covering 
the perpetual efforts analytical reason made to reform itself when it aspired 
to account for language, society and thought, L^vi-Strauss thought that Sartre 
3 Lawrence Rosen, 'Language, history and the logic of inquiry in the works 
of L6vi-Strauss', in The unconscious in culture; the structuralism of 
Claude Lgvi-Strauss, New York, Dutton, 1974, p. 390. 
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vacillated between the two conceptions of dialectical and analytical 
reason. Whilst on the one hand he opposed dialectical and analytical 
reasons as truth and error, and almost as God and devil, at other times 
he apparently considered these two kinds of reason as complementary routes 
to the same truth'*. L^vi-Strauss w a s , to a certain extent, justified in 
this criticism, as he was in his comments on the use of the term 'history': 
"One is hard put to it to see whether it is meant to be the 
history men make unconsciously, the history of men 
consciously made by historians, the philosopher's 
interpretation of the history of men or his interpretation 
of the history of historians"^. 
Sartre made indirect responses to these criticisms; but it was only in 
1966, in an interview given to Les Cahiers de Philosophie, entitled 
' L ' A n t h r o p o l o g i e ' t h a t he made his position on the study of man clear. 
He asserted that only a change in methods could give rise to a total study 
of m a n , and maintained that one should adopt an approach proving successful 
in the treatment of mentally handicapped children; that is, that one should 
treat the child, not as an object inserted into society, but as a developing 
concern, which changes with the passage of time, which is part of a larger 
process, and which is at the same time i n d i v i d u a l ^ Structural analysis, 
he considered, gave one a false synthesis, for this type of anthropology 
merely presented a certain objective reflection. Sartre asserted that only 
4 L^vi-Strauss, The savage min d, pp. 245-246. 
5 Ibid, p. 250. 
6 J-P. Sartre, 'L'Anthropologie', in Cahiers de philosophie, no. 2, 
3 f^vrier, 1966. Later published in Situations IX. 
7 Situations IX, p. 84. 
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philosophy can be said to make a dialectical study, because the historian 
or anthropologist is an historical being too, that is to say that he is 
'situated' relative to the group he is studying. Philosophy begins at the 
moment when the dialectical relationship history/structure reveals to us 
that, in every case, man - taken as an actual member of a given society, 
and not as an abstract human nature - is only a quasi-object for man. 
Anthropology, as it stands, cannot bridge the gap between the actual 
person and abstract human nature, nor can linguistics, which separates 
meaning from the w o r d , although Marxism might develop some other method 
of totalisation. Sartre described the moment when the complete picture 
is achieved: 
"La comprehension, c'est, apr&s I'dtude du module, de voir 
le mod&le en marche a travers I'histoire. Le moment de la 
comprehension totale serait le moment ou T o n comprendrait 
le groupe historique par son langage et le langage par son 
groupe historique"®. 
Sartre went on to emphasise the extent of his philosophical approach, 
drawing on examples from L'Idiot de la famille, which was at that time 
still in progress^. He pointed out that we learn about a man not just 
from what he does, but also from what he does not do, or refuses to do. 
Sartre sees history as a recurring structure - man is the son of man. 
This attitude allows him to understand both continuity and discontinuity in 
the historical process, and to affirm that history is made finite by the 
8 p. 91. 
9 Two lengthy articles appeared in Les Temps Modernes in 1965 and 
1966. 
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number of humans in the historical series. It also allows him in part to 
accept Engels's statement that men make their own history on the basis of 
real prior conditions; for death may be considered a prior condition, and 
yet it is charged with human life and action. Since history is a 
recurring structure, Sartre has scope to relate and interrelate incidents, 
including the possibility of using contemporary events and his own 
experience to elucidate the past. In L'etre et le neant, he had argued that 
it was impossible to enter another man's skin to recapitulate the exact 
relationship between his actions and perceptions. In the Critique, the 
reader notes a shift of emphasis, for while Sartre still argued that it was 
impossible to completely enter the world of another person, particularly if 
that person were dead, he began to acknowledge that through a study of his 
own being, the writer could hope to elucidate the process by which man 
affects and is affected by his conception of reality. 
L'Idiot de 1a famille claims a measure of empathy between Sartre and 
his subject, Flaubert, and lends weight to the argument that history is a 
recurring structure. In a discussion on the Second Empire, Sartre likens 
Louis Napoleon and his regime to the Roman Empire under Nero, a favourite 
symbol of his for oppressive regimes. Flaubert, similarly, seems to have 
been aware of historical parallels between events, for he saw in the 
invasion of France by the Germans in 1870 a re-enactment of the invasion 
by Attila the Hun^°. 
10 J-P. Sartre, L'Idiot de la famille, Paris, Gallimard, 1971-72, v. 3, 
p. 593. 
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Georges Balandier, a political anthropologist, asks^^: "What 
exactly is history?" He begins to answer his question by quoting from 
Evans-Pritchard's Anthropology and history,- where Evans-Pritchard maintains 
that the debate will be resolved only if a clear distinction is made between 
the means of historical knowledge, the forms taken by historical development 
and the ideological expressions in which real history is clothed. Balandier 
sees a duality of historical expression: "a public history (unchanging in 
its general features and concerning a whole ethnic entity) which co-exists 
with a private history (defined in detail, subject to distortions, concerned 
with particular groups, and their specific interests)", and he criticises 
Sartre for maintaining that only a foreign history could be totally 
assimilated, or "interiorised". The evidence for this view is to be 
found throughout Sartre's writings relating to the Algerian crisis, and in 
L'Idiot de la famille in the section dealing with the life of Charles 
Leconte de Lisle. Briefly, Sartre believed that the native population, 
oppressed by the colonising power, interiorised the culture of their 
oppressors, and then reproduced aspects of this culture as weapons to 
oppose or destroy the imposed culture. 
Sartre remained sceptical of some of the tenets of structuralism, 
for he sees that any structure imposed on man, including even History, may 
be limiting. For this reason too, he was suspicious of the historical 
determinism of classical Marxism, since it detracts from the freedom of 
the individual. His attitude towards history is summed up by Simone de 
Beauvoir: 
11 Balandier, pp. 19-20. 
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"The historical whole at every moment determines our powers, 
it fixes limits to our field of action and to our real future, 
it conditions our attitude towards the possible and the 
impossible, the real and the imaginary, what is and what 
should be, time and space; after this we in turn determine 
our relations with others, that is, the meaning of our life 
and the value of our death; it is within these limits that 
our Me finally appears. It is history which shows some 
people a way out and causes others to mark time in front 
of closed doors"^^. 
However, in spite of this scepticism, Sartre weaves into his writings a 
structuralism based on a similar concept to one accepted by L^vi-Strauss -
that of the third or mediating party in any conceptual scheme. For Sartre, 
this 'third party' is external to the empirical subject matter, not being 
of the same order as that which is observed. As he explains in L'ecrivain 
et sa langue^ ^ , we are inside language, rather than language being inside 
us; thus language may appear as property, and the user enters into a 
bourgeois relationship with it, if he uses language to communicate: 
"Dans la prose, il y a reciprocite; dans la poesie, je pense 
que I'autre sert uniquement de rev^lateur. Je crois que le 
projet po^tique n'implique pas la communication au meme degre"^'*. 
Structure, then, may be said to reside in the objectivity of the observer, 
Sartre is concerned in L'Idiot de la famille with the form and content 
of society. The difference between structure and form is admirably described 
by the Russian formalist, Vladimir Propp: "Form is defined by opposition to 
content, which is foreign to it. But structure has no distinct content; it is 
the content itself apprehended in a logical organisation conceived as a 
12 Cited in Raymond Aron, Marxism and the existentialists. New York, Harper 
and Row, 1969, p. 70. 
13 An interview given to Pierre Verstraeten, 'L'ecrivain et sa langue', 
published in Situations IX. 
14 Ibid, p. 58. 
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property of the real." Sartre refers frequently to A. L. Kroeber's 
Anthropology, in particular to the section 'Ethos and eidos; form and 
content; values'^^ He elaborates these ideas within the framework of 
Flaubert's artistic inspiration: 
"Le flot boueux du quotidien ne s'organise pas de lui-m§me pour 
offrir au regard I'unit^ d'une essence ou d'un type: 1'experience 
ne pr^sente que des ^bauches; 1'artiste est celui qui en d§gage 
1'eidos par une triple Elaboration de ces donn^es, unifiant, 
isolant et radicalisant I'apport empirique"^®. 
This is quite close to Flaubert's own position which Sartre quotes later 
in the work: 
"Les informations sont du domaine des signes, mais le sens d'un 
ouvrage de 1'esprit nous est communique indirectement par sa 
beaute formelle"^^. 
Moving away from the sphere of the artistic, Sartre seems to apply the 
ethos/eidos argument to types of thinking. Sartre identifies two ways 
15 "Greek eidos, from which we have "idol" as a derivative, denotes form 
or appearance or likeness. The eidos of a culture would therefore be 
its appearance. The Greek word ethos, from which we have 'ethics', 
denotes first of all disposition. With reference to a people, it means 
their ways or customs, corresponding nearly to Latin mores. Like that 
term, it carries an implication of what is sanctioned and expected . . . 
It will be evident from these examples that ethos deals with qualities 
that pervade the whole culture - like a flavour - as contrasted with 
the aggregate of separable constituents that make up its formal 
appearance and are the eidos. The ethos includes the direction in 
which a culture is oriented, the things it aims at, prizes and endorses, 
and more or less achieves. We are here getting into metaphors that 
personify culture as if it had a will and a purpose of its own. That 
is a fault of the language of our day. Scientific thinking has penetrated 
so recently into these fields that it has failed as yet to work out its 
own more exact expressions." A. L. Kroeber, Anthropology, rev. ed, New 
York, Harcourt, Brace and New World Inc., 1948, pp. 293-4. 
16 L'Idiot, p. 999. 
17 Ibid, p. 1619. 
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of thinking; with the head and with the heart^®. Thinking with the head 
is rational, it is logical and is recognised by its form. Thinking with 
the heart is irrational and is important for its content. Another aspect 
of the ethos/eidos argument is to be found in Sartre's insistence on the 
link between having and being, which on occasion seems to dominate the 
established notion of the link between doing and being when applied to 
Flaubert. In Critique.de la raison dialectique, Sartre had posited 'need' 
as the motivating force in human relationships. He picks up this theme when 
he writes that for Flaubert: "Pour etre, il faut avoir; et T o n e^t ce que 
I'on a: telle est la m^taphysique du proprietaire, telle est celle de 
Gustave, proprietaire manque"^^; and he elaborates it in a discussion on 
the ability to live without living, to express eidos without ethos. "[La 
richesse] a delivre le riche de la necessite; Flaubert reve parfois qu'elle 
peut le d^livrer du besoin meme"^°, because desires fulfilled will continually 
deliver him from necessity, and eventually, the knowledge and anticipation 
of this fulfilment will take the place of the basic needs. This notion, 
stressing the ultimate uselessness of wealth and possessions, returns the 
reader to the notion of formal beauty, which also has neither substance nor 
use. 
In the way he deals with the content of society, Sartre may be compared 
with the American anthropologist, Robert Redfield. L'Idiot de la famille 
conforms in many aspects to Redfield's description of the study of a small 
c o m m u n i t y ^ F o r , in spite of its length and scope, it is not the study of 
18 Ibid, p. 1057. 'Animus pense, anima palpite.' 
19 Ibid, p. 1077. 
20 Ibid, p. 1076. 
21 Robert Redfield, The little community, Chicago, Chicago U.P., 1960. 
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a large scale society; it is a study of the society of one man. The 
similarity in approach can be seen by comparing Sartre's view of the aim 
of anthropology with the sub-title to Redffeld's The little community: 
'Viewpoints for the study of a human whole'. Redfield emphasises the 
importance of the content of a given society at a number of levels. He 
suggests the need to view the 'little community' as a whole, as an ecological 
system and as a social structure; he considers the importance of setting 
a perspective through history on an appropriate time-scale and of seeing 
the 'little community' as a community within communities. In comparing 
Redfield's method of investigation with Sartre's, the reader is struck by 
the similarity in approach to biography as a necessary part of the study 
of any society. Redfield emphasises the importance of biography in the 
study of a 'little community'^^, stating that in order to discuss a human 
life and its development it is necessary to tell of the changing states of 
mind of the person who lives that life, and that the biographic form should 
make it possible to study the influence upon men's actual lives of the ideas 
which may prevail in their society. Like Sartre, Redfield considers a study 
of the mind as it develops in infancy and childhood important, and concurs 
that the methodology of psychoanalysis seems to offer the clearest conceptions 
yet put forward^^. Finally, Sartre's writing implies complete agreement with 
Redfield's statement that "the social structure of a small community is a set 
of limiting conditions within which the conduct of individuals takes place"^". 
Kinship represents an important area of investigation for many 
anthropologists. The concern, here, is of the relationships of person to 
22 p. 59. 
23 Ibid, p. 64. 
24 Ibid, p. 46. 
- 23 -
person. 'Social structure' is a term sometimes used to include this type 
of human relationship. Redfield comments" on the lack of precision with 
which this term is used, and cites^^ Professor Raymond Firth's interest in 
'social alignment', 'the ordering of the personnel component of the 
community'. 
L^vi-Strauss viewed kinship as systems of marital exchange. In these 
systems, he saw sets of rules, which, although they could be varied or 
modified, existed regardless of the individuals who enacted them and were, 
in their very constitution, limited in their operating procedures. He 
believed that these systems could only be discerned at a deep analytical 
level. Sartre, on the other hand, emphasised that each individual must 
make, at some level, the choice to remain in the group and abide by its 
rules, so that each person actually pledges his participation in a given 
marriage system rather than having it imposed on him. 
In evaluating these radically different points of view, it is necessary 
to remember that Levi-Strauss was trying, like many other anthropologists, to 
capture the last traditional moments of a people, whilst Sartre was 
investigating a society already in transition. He was keen to show, both 
in regard to Flaubert and to himself, that the ideas received by the child 
were not those of the parents, but of the grandparents, as in many peasant 
cultures. Gustave Flaubert's father, Achi11e-Cl^ophas, had been brought up 
in the country, the son of a veterinarian. Sartre claims that this implied, 
on his arrival in Rouen, that his attitudes were a generation behind those of 
25 Ibid, p. 33. 
26 Ibid, p. 34. 
- 24 -
his contemporaries, and that thus his own children were to be brought up 
in a manner fitting to a past epoch. The proof of this argument is 
tenuous, given Achi1le-Cl§ophas' interest in science and progress. 
However, it is not so far-fetched to suggest that the school programme of 
the 1830's was inculcating, through literature primarily, ideas current 
before the Revolution. In a stable society, this type of education would 
obviously lead to a continuation of the status quo; in a society in 
transition, it is clear that such breaks in the transmission of ideas can 
only lead to a pendulum action between extremes of conservatism and extremes 
of progress. Disputes between father and son may give rise to an infringement 
of traditional values, and ultimately lead to a breakdown of society. Sartre 
discusses Flaubert's attitude towards the career his father chose for him: 
"II sera du barreau, puisque son p^re le veut, mais son etre 
d'avocat sera la subversion institute; comedien, il eOt fait 
rire les autres; avocat, il leur reprendra le rire et les 
rendre risibles"^'^. 
In accordance with Sartre's belief in the primacy of action, the infringement 
of the group's rules must occur through deliberate action to break them, 
rather than through an inertia which fails to observe them. Thus he states 
that for Flaubert to tear himself away from his bourgeois milieu, he must 
find a way which will allow him to appear 'inhuman', at the same time as it 
allows him to remain a man. Flaubert was to find this alienation through 
beauty: 
"le Beau, alienation des hommes ^ une fin inhumaine, est d'abord 
1'alienation de 1'Artiste a son Art. Cette alienation rigide est, 
pense Gustave, sa liberation de 1'§tre-de-classe." 
27 L'Idiot, p. 881. 
28 Ibid, p. 1487. 
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Sartre discusses the contradiction inherent in Flaubert's attitude 
towards his family situation - the tension between his desire to stay, 
to maintain both his youth and the family tradition, and his desire to 
break away completely. He suggest that Flaubert's debilitating nervous illness 
was at least a provisional way to remain in the bosom of his family, and that 
his desire to be feminine was an affirmation of this desire to remain 
protected^^. And yet, in 1840, Flaubert had already discovered, with some 
terror, that the artist, in his own way, is a man of action. Sartre 
demonstrates the strength of this contradiction in a brilliant discussion 
of Kafka's story. The Metamorphosis, where the reader is made painfully 
aware of the desire to change, and equally of the fear of change and the 
desire to remain the same^°. 
Many societies include in their relations between individuals a type 
of contact known as 'joking relationships'. Radcliffe-Brown defines a 
joking relationship as a 'peculiar combination of friendliness and 
antagonism'^^, a kind of permitted disrespect. This permits contact 
which would otherwise be forbidden within the society. Sartre goes to 
great lengths to show that Flaubert and his schoolmates had such a 
relationship with their teachers and other elders, through a character 
which they created and named Le Gargon. It was generally acknowledged that 
Le Gargon was Flaubert's creation, although any of the boys in the group 
could slip into the role, giving him the opportunity to infringe the normal 
social conventions, usually at the expense of the other person. One may 
wonder at the three hundred page section on Le Gar9on, questioning its 
importance within the text; it is indeed not until volume three that the 
29 Ibid, p. 1675. 
30 Ibid, p. 1762. 
31 A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and function in primitive society, 
London, Cohen and West, 1952, p. 90. 
- 2 6 -
the reader is fully aware of the significance of the existence of a joking 
relationship. Here, Sartre deals with Flaubert's relationship to the 
Second Empire, and in particular to Louis Napoleon. Flaubert seems to see 
in the Second Empire a re-enactment both of the First Empire, and also of 
the situation before the Revolution, although he is also aware that the 
Second Empire situation is a travesty which degrades these previous regimes; 
Louis Napoleon is a feeble impersonation of Napoleon Bonaparte. Sartre 
also claims that Flaubert identified with Louis Napoleon: 
"Louis Bonaparte . . . lui paratt plus divertissant. Pour une 
curieuse raison: il croit voir en lui une incarnation du Garcon"^^. 
"Ou peut-§tre, c'est une reincarnation de N^ron, cet empereur 
cruel dont Flaubert s'est plu si souvent ^ jouer le r61e, par 
sadisme, faisant d'un froncement de sourcils, rouler des t§tes 
imaginaires. Dans les evenements qui precedent le coup d'Etat, 
ce jeune homme enrag^ ne voit qu'une vaste entreprise de 
demoralisation nationale et d'avi1issement du genre humain"^^. 
The relative values of science and myth, knowledge and belief, have 
been discussed in innumerable academic papers. Levi-Strauss's attitude 
to science and myth is expressed by anthropologist Stanley Diamond^'': 
"For L^vi-Strauss science represents a superior myth, it not 
only presumes to be, but actually is closer to the truth, the 
'myth of myth', since science can reveal myth, but myth cannot 
explicate science. Thus, Levi-Strauss, at one stroke 
rationalises myth and mystifies rationality." 
To this attitude, he contrasted Sartre's study on anti-Semitism, Reflexions 
sur la question juive, written in 1946. Here he found an argument which is 
"directed against all hyper-rational analytic, abstract, reductive and 
scientific modes of conceiving the world"^^. 
32 L'Idiot, V. 3, p. 455. 
33 L' Idiot, V. 3, p. 456. 
34 Stanley Diamond, 'The myth of structuralism', in The unconscious in 
culture, p. 303. 
35 Ibid, p. 324. 
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In L'Idiot de la fam111e the opposition between scientism and 
faith is, in one way or another, pervasive. There is no clear cut 
acceptance of the one over the other, for as Sartre writes about Flaubert: 
"he never stopped confusing Knowledge and Faith, Belief and Affirmation." 
Although Sartre considers this confusion a sign of the times, as well as 
the opposition of masculine and feminine natures, in the main he relates 
directly to Flaubert's experiences. He takes Scientism, a manifestation 
of a masculine nature, as referring to the attitude of Flaubert's father, 
Achille-Cldophas, an up-and-coming bourgeois, and Faith, a manifestation 
of a feminine nature, as referring to the attitude of his mother, a member 
of the aristocracy. The science of his father was readily visible; 
dissection of cadavers appears as a kind of analysis. In the same way 
that the body is matter and can be cut up, so too, presumably, can the 
soul be dissected. Although all the Flaubert children were familiar with 
this form of analysis, Sartre claims that Gustave never witnessed a 
synthesis (interpreted as the sewing up of a dissected corpse) and thus 
he was left with an incomplete picture of the analytical, objective nature 
of science. 
Given the choice, Sartre says, between Religion and Science, Flaubert 
would obviously choose Science: 
"Ce qu'il demande a L'Eglise est plus subtile: il ne s'agit pas 
de se jeter contre la m^canique newtonienne comme Don Quichotte 
contre les moulins h vent; encore moins de multiplier les miracles 
truqu^s pour nous faire voir Dieu sur terre, puisqu'il n'y est pas 
et que les lois de la Nature n'y sont jamais suspendues. Non: 
son problfeme est plus profond, c'est celui de toute une g^n^ration 
qui veut r^agir contre le jacobinisme de ses peres mais se trouve 
jet^e dans des difficult^s nouvelles par 1'enrichissement du 
Savoir: comment garder ou retrouver la Foi tout en absorbant la 
Science exp^rimentale?"^® 
36 L'Idiot, p. 531. 
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And yet, emphasising the confusion he claimed belonged to Flaubert, 
Sartre later states that Faith belonged to the non-reader and the 
illiterate^^, when he had already established that Gustave was a 
non-reader. He continues to emphasise the fact that Flaubert seems 
to cling to the ideology of his mother. On a secular level, this 
leads him to consider the way in which the state was constituted, and 
to believe in the divine right of kings; this was proof for Flaubert 
of the generosity of God, passing his goodness through the monarch to 
the people, who returned a loving obedience to God through their obedience 
to their king. On a religious level, Sartre endows Flaubert with the 
belief that he may take the place of Absolute Power. Although he never 
fully substantiates his tentative claim that Flaubert saw himself in the 
place of God^®, Sartre goes on to construct a kind of moral terrain, where 
rising and falling, or ascending and descending have an obsessive polarity 
for Flaubert, and are used as classificatory principles. However, he 
imposes a topsy-turvy absurdity on this world, expressing the view that 
descent to the lowest level is in fact arrival at the highest point, and 
that one climbs in order to fall back. Sartre indicates that Flaubert had 
always shown an interest in vertical groupings. The quality of his family 
to him meant that he should always occupy a privileged position. However, 
at school this seemed not to be the case, for his school fellows excelled. 
Therefore, in Sartre's view, Flaubert concluded that to be on top can equal 
failure or evil : 
"a partir de 1835, le Diable est toujours en haut et, du coup, il 
emporte au Zenith ses victimes; ainsi I'^l^vation diabolique est 
^quivalente 5 la tentation qui, sous les plumes chr^tiennes, fait 
succomber et choir."^^ 
37 Ibid_, pp. 584-585. 
38 Ibid, p. 595. 
39 Ibid, p. 1184. 
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Taking up this point, Sartre conceives the notion of what he calls 
Flaubert's 'negative verticality': 
"cette posture qui 1'attire - s'^tendre sur le dos, 6crasg, 
r^duit ^ 1'impuissance - symbolise a ses yeux, sans qu'il puisse 
le declarer expl icitement, le retour ^ sa premiere enfance . . . 
However, the term implies more than the feminine weakness of fainting fits 
or hysteria. To explain this, Sartre introduces one of Flaubert's very 
early stories, Quidquid volueris. Here, Flaubert himself uses the opposing 
notions of being lifted up to fall - an eagle carries off a young person, 
who is subsequently ravished on a mountain-top - "assomption et pSmoison 
s'opposent: c'est monter pour choir""^. A sexual element is thus 
introduced. Sartre's implicit suggestion is that through his 'negative 
verticality' Flaubert refuses to accept his responsibility as male. The 
opposition of masculine and feminine, active and passive elements, has been 
a factor of Sartre's writing from the very beginning, and is used here to 
quite good effect to denote Flaubert as a passive figure in Sartre's 
philosophical terms. 
Sartre has not only constructed an anthropological study on 
contemporary lines, he has also incorporated Kant's advice to use world 
history, biography, plays and novels as important tools for anthropological 
study. The early sections of volume three draw attention to French 
history in the nineteenth century, linking what Balandier called 'public 
history' to Flaubert's private life. Sartre also allows discussion, 
indirectly, of contemporary events, for example the Algerian crisis, 
which had preoccupied him during the late'50's and early '60's, and he 
40 Ibid, p. 594. 
41 Quoted in L'Idiot, p. 44. 
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includes slogans and comments from the student upheavals in France in 
May 1968. Here too, to strengthen the picture Sartre has painted of 
nineteenth century French society, he offers the reader a study of 
Leconte de Lisle, Flaubert's contemporary by birth and social standing. 
It is perhaps in his own comments and in the comments projected 
through the literary characterisation of Flaubert, on the subject of 
plays and novels, that Sartre goes furthest in fulfilling Kant's advice. 
He draws a telling parallel between one of his own characters and Gustave: 
"1'enfant et le com^dien ont la m§me impuissance et les memes 
vis^es. A cette difference pr^s que Kean ne ressent pas r^ellement 
la peur qu'il repr^sente au lieu que Gustave est convaincu 
d'exprimer ce qu'il ressent.'"*^ 
Statements on the works of writers such as Zola, Musset, Th^ophile 
Gautier and the Goncourts are generally pertinent, and his careful study 
of the reading habits of Gustave Flaubert is fascinating, both for what 
it expresses about Flaubert as well as for what it implies about Sartre. 
Through his interest in Kant's philosophy, Sartre has added another 
dimension to his anthropological study. 
It is therefore possible to evaluate L'Idiot de la famille against 
criteria set by some of the world's leading anthropologists. Even though 
the overall perspective is philosophical, the study remains valid as an 
anthropological investigation, for it examines those aspects of society 
acknowledged as fundamental to any ethnography. At the level of the 
information gathered, the picture is somewhat different. A close examination 
42 Ibid, p. 669. 
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of the facts Sartre deals with in his attempt to found an anthropology 
reveals that the information is based on imagination rather than 
empiricism. This need not, however, prevent L'Idiot de la fami11e from 
being considered an anthropological investigation, in the same way 
that the works of Carlos Castaneda, almost certainly works of the 
imagination, are considered by some reviewers to be fine examples of 
ethnography"^. 
43 Richard de Mille, Castaneda's journey: the power and the allegory, 
Santa Barbara, Capra Press, 1976. 
THE SOLITARY INDIVIDUAL; THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 
The second facet of the prism to be investigated in this study is 
the situation of the solitary individual, both in the real and symbolic 
worlds. Sartre's main aim, in volumes I and II of L'Idiot de la famille, 
is to discover the way in which a person's identity is produced. He no 
longer contends that man has utter freedom of choice over his destiny, 
but allows of a certain determination : 
"Les prgjug^s du milieu ont pour effet de limiter les 
possibilit^s tout autant que la volont^ tenace de monter 
les ^largira. Par toutes ces raisons . . . un enfant, bien 
avant de nSitre, est ddsign^ par un certain champ de possibles 
assez restreint et fort nettement organist qui lui reflate 
les besoins sociaux d^finis par sa classe, h travers les 
options de groupes d^cisoires et, finalement, ^ travers la 
volonte de son p&re"^. 
Sartre does, however, distinguish between men who have been formed as a 
result of deliberately committed actions - men forged by history, who 
crush the child they once were - and men who accepted their 'prehistory'^. 
He seems to condemn the latter, including amongst them, Gustave Flaubert, 
whilst maintaining that he himself belongs to the former. 
A person cannot operate within society unless he acts with one 
identity. Sartre recognises that Flaubert found it very difficult to 
establish his own concept of 'self, and examines this problem in detail 
in the First Book of the Second Part of L'Idiot de la famille - 'What is 
the Beautiful if not the Impossible?' (pp. 653-1107), specifically in the 
section 'He and I'. Sartre suggests that Flaubert's solution was to move 
through the realm of imaginary situations to the point where he became an 
1 _L' Idiot, p. 1477. 
2 Ibid, p. 55. 
- 33 -
actor. For Flaubert, to be real is to be believed. This coincides with 
the view of self-hood expressed by Abner Cohen: 
"Selfhood is achieved by man when he interacts with other men 
with the totality of his personality. In the performance of 
a single, highly specialised, contractual role, the totality 
of the self is least involved. On the other hand, maximum 
involvement of the self is achieved through non-contractual, 
non-utilitarian roles and activities in symbolic action. 
As Morris (1972) puts it: 'People are at their most 
individual and personal when they engage in drama. 
In Cohen's book. Two-dimensional man, he argues that the individual 
is motivated by two types of forces, which he names political and 
symbolic. These are forces which also structure society. Power is 
generally seen to reside in the political (including economic) institutions; 
the importance of the symbolic institutions, however, is not to be 
underestimated for these include kinship, and religion and ritual. 
Cohen maintains that in any society both the individual and society 
as a whole recognise these forces, and in a stable situation keep them 
at all times separate. He discusses the identity of the individual, and 
the ways in which both the political and the symbolic afford sources of 
power to the individual. Similarly, in L'Idiot de la famille, Sartre 
investigates the identity of the individual, dealing with both political 
and symbolic structures, tightly interweaving the two orders. The 
reader is frequently uneasy as Sartre violates one of the principles of 
societal organisation which Cohen takes as fundamental - that the political 
and symbolic aspects of society should maintain their integrity. 
Whether dealing with political or symbolic man, Sartre examines 
society at the level of the individual. In his approach, traces of the 
3 Abner Cohen, Two-dimensional man, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1974, p. 55. 
- 34 -
influence of Dilthey are recognisable, particularly in his formulation 
of the notion that social-historical reality consists of individual human 
beings, who alone think, feel and act, and so produce languages, religions 
and institutions. More marked is the influence of Max Weber. His 
statements on what is known as 'action theory' could easily have been 
Sartre's: 
"Interpretive sociology considers the individual and his 
action as the basic unit, as its 'atom'. . . The individual 
is . . . the upper limit and the sole carrier of meaningful 
conduct . . . Such concepts as 'state', 'association', 
'feudalism' and the like, designate certain categories of 
human interaction. Hence it is the task of sociology to 
reduce these concepts to 'understandable' action, that is, 
without exception, to the actions of participating 
individuals.'"* 
Sartre, however, goes much further than the transactionalists, who, as 
George Herbert Mead did, would argue that a man's very self-identity 
is formed through inter-action with other men. His social theory is 
constructed in ways which make it impossible to understand social 
relations, for it is not built on a sense of society at all, but on 
abstract, isolated individuals. Even though in L'Idiotde la famille, 
he goes some way towards accepting that man is in a dialectical relationship 
with society, an entity in itself, yet the theory poses an intellectual 
problem. Sartre's social relations are not truly social; he takes society 
as a group of people, working separately, and contends that to produce a 
more complex society, one need only add more people. 
Sartre's concern with the position of the solitary individual in 
society implies acknowledgement of alienation. This is fundamental to 
4 Froiji Max Weber: essays in sociology. New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1946, p. 55. 
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L' Idiot de la f a m i n e . His concept of alienation is not that as suffered 
by the industrial working class, but as imposed by their social and 
political condition on the middle classes.. Sartre had been working out 
this view since L'gtre et le ngant;during his involvement with the 
Algerian war, he expressed it succinctly in the Preface to Albert Memmi's 
The coloniser and the colonised. Here, he proposed that 'No one can treat 
a man like a dog without first regarding him as a man. The impossible 
dehumanisation of the oppressed . . . becomes the alienation of the 
oppressor. It is the oppressor himself who restores, with his slightest 
gesture, the humanity he seeks to destroy; and since he destroys humanity 
in others, he regards it everywhere as his enemy. To handle this, the 
coloniser must assume the opaque rigidity and imperviousness of stone. 
In short he must dehumanise himself as well.' Thus the middle classes may 
be responsible for their own alienation; a consequence of this alienation 
may be hatred. Sartre maintains, in L'Idiot de 1a famille, that a man's 
relationship with another man may be defined as a reciprocity of hatred, 
which is 'the true mediation of the upper classes'. If, Sartre states, 
the dominant relationship is not one of reciprocal hatred, then it will 
become a complicity of hatred against a third person, considered as a 
representative of the human race^. This statement would seem to suggest 
that insofar as men do share in their social relations, this is only a 
possibility for the upper classes. 
Readers have come to expect Sartre's attacks on the bourgeois state; 
none has been quite so ingenious as that set out in L'Idiot de la famille, 
where one is never quite sure whether one is reading the ideas of Flaubert, 
the ideas of Sartre writing as though he were Flaubert or the ideas of 
5 L'Idiot, V. 3, p. 335. 
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Sartre writing as himself. Without even mentioning the bourgeoisie, 
Sartre launches an attack through his picturing of Flaubert's father, 
whom he postulates as an acknowledged member of the bourgeoisie. He 
describes Flaubert's relations with his father as feudal: that is to 
say, the link between men is that of giver and receiver, with Flaubert 
as vassal, or receiver. Thus both men are removed from their class of 
origin and related to a regime which the elder would have abhorred. 
Sartre expands on this notion, when he asserts that Flaubert believed 
his rightful place was above others, a place which should not be acquired, 
but bestowed. Thus he is able to substantiate Flaubert's adherence to a 
hereditary monarchy, which was based on a belief in the divine right of 
kings. Again this attitude attacks the bourgeois state, as it places 
reliance on super-human powers. Sartre points out that the fall of the 
Bourbons destroyed Flaubert's dream of an extraordinary society, but it 
built up its own myth, founded on resentment, that of the undiscoverable 
Aristocracy^. Even if the presence of superior beings was not apparent, 
nevertheless, their existence was recognised. 
On a similar theme, Sartre notes that through his correspondence, 
Flaubert expressed a desire to be fabulously wealthy. Not once did he 
mention the possibility of making money, for the only admissible wealth 
was that which was inherited. As a consumer, Flaubert would live on his 
patrimony, refusing to add to it himself. It was not that he was unaware 
of the origins of the money - be it earned by blood or by sweat - but that 
the transmission of money from father to son ennobled it. 
6 Ibid, p. 605. 
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Sartre, in his attempts to show the establishment of Flaubert's 
identity in the political, or real world, continually brings the reader 
to the symbolic or imagined world. Even the attack on the bourgeois 
father/son relationship is transposed to another class, and discussed as 
a feudal relationship. 
Flaubert's comprehension of the political regimes under which he 
lived shows an uncomfortable mingling of external reality and imagined 
reality, the political and the symbolic. It was not until the Second 
Empire and the accession to the throne of Louis Napoleon that Flaubert 
really understood the government of his country. He recognised the 
situation, including Louis Napoleon, as imaginary - a reconstruction 
of the Empire under Napoleon Bonaparte. And yet it was real because 
the French people believed in it. Flaubert had something in common 
with this emperor/impostor. He saw traits of his own character in Louis 
Napoleon - the sadistic, demoralising streak, representing his heroes 
de Sade and Nero. He saw him as an incarnation of Le Gargon, the joking 
relationship figure created in his boyhood. Flaubert then was justified 
in his symbolic level of existence, and could even hope to be acclaimed 
on a political 1evel. 
Sartre also examined Flaubert in Cohen's 'non-contractual, non-
utilitarian roles'. He claims that, because he is so unsure of his own 
identity, Flaubert opts for anti-Cartesianism, and for irrationality. 
"S'il ne parvient qu'a produire des images, n'est-ce pas 
qu'il est lui-mgme une image?" 
7 Ibid, p. 677. 
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In fact, Sartre says, Flaubert is not sure that he even exists. The 
most he can do is to believe that others believe in him, but that this 
uncertainty is revealed whenever he says 'Moi, je . . . '. Moi refers 
to the unity of the innumerable faces he unwittingly offers to others; 
je is the subject of praxis and of all affirmation^. This is a flimsy 
shred of evidence even though there are others to strengthen the case. 
Sartre would seem to imply that those who use this fairly common speech 
pattern may be suffering from an identity crisis. 
He states early in L'Idiot de la famille that without a knowledge of 
early childhood, one cannot even say that the biographer is building on 
sand; he is building on mist, with fog^. The reader might easily feel 
that basing the constitution of a man's personality on an interpretation 
of a common speech pattern falls into the same mould. However, Sartre 
continues to build on the mist. He notes that as Flaubert's personality 
developed, creating the dichotomy between He and I, the loss of identity 
worsened. One is aware of the influence of the early Freudian notion of 
the Ego and the Id. Sartre moves farther into a symbolic order, by equating 
'He' with the figure of the Sadistic Lord and 'I' with the Masochistic Child, 
Barnes^° comments that Sartre makes sexuality as basic to human 
existence as Freud does. For Freud, movement of the libido is determined 
from the start by the biological characteristics inherent in a particular 
sex, and these influence the total personality structure. For Sartre, 
sexual desire is a desire for a body, a wish to possess the Other as flesh, 
8 Ibid, p. 673. 
9 Ibid, p. 55. 
10 Barnes, p. 61. 
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but is certainly not the desire to possess the body as a thing. It is the 
desire to trap consciousness in the body, so that what one possesses is not 
simply body, but embodied consciousness. Throughout L'Idiot de la famille, 
Sartre refers to Flaubert and his sexuality. He links it with Flaubert's 
alienation, allowing him a way to transcend this alienation by bestowing a 
value on himself: 
"Ali^n^ par principe, il cherche ^ vivre cette alienation sous 
la forme sexuelle pour charger de convoitise les froids regards 
qui le transpercent, pour donner une ardeur secr&te aux mains qui 
la reconstituent: il serait, du moins, valorise comme objet de 
convoitise."^ ^  
This sexuality was one of the ways in which Sartre sees Flaubert as 
imposing himself on those around him. For, whilst love may lead to 
masochism, sexual desire may bring one to sadism. According to Sartre, 
Flaubert admired the sadistic. Sartre quotes a letter from Flaubert to 
Ernest Chevalier, written in 1838, in which he praised highly Rabelais 
and Byron, 
"les deux seuls qui aient gcrit dans 1'intention de nuire au genre 
humain et de lui rire & la face. Quelle immense position que eelle 
d'un homme ainsi plac^ devant le monde."^^ 
Flaubert is shown as wishing to emulate his heroes, his attitude being 
curiously intertwined with the notion of ascent and descent. Sartre takes 
it for granted that Flaubert only wanted fame and glory in order to avenge 
himself on his father: 
"Mais il pretend obtenir [la gloire] en faisant rire de soi. 
C'est convoiter la gloire infamante des bouffons. N'est-ce 
pas s'^carter de son intention primitive? Peut-il vouloir 
a la fois faire I'orgueil et la honte de sa famille ou plus 
exactement, illustrer le nom de son p^re en le d^shonorant."^^ 
11 L'Idiot, p. 686. 
12 Ibid, p. 1211. 
13 Ibid, p. 831. 
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Whatever Flaubert's motives for wanting public acclaim, he found 
himself again faced by the dichotomy of the personal and the public, the 
symbolic and the political, an extension of the notion of He and I, 
Sartre draws our attention to the fact that at the same time as Flaubert 
received public acclaim for Madame Bovary, the public prosecutor instituted 
proceedings against him. Sartre notes that this merely confirmed Flaubert's 
attitude that power was vested in Art. It is clear how this episode 
incorporated elements of the symbolic and political aspects of man. 
This idea, however, seems to be as much one of Sartre's own. He 
discusses at length in volume 3 the power of literature, its place in 
society and the duty of the artist, and his arguments may be stated as 
follows: literature structures the bourgeoisie by creating, little by 
little, the key parts of its ideology; each ruling class wants its own 
literature; the author should write so that his finished work constitutes 
an act. 
This exposition helps to clarify Sartre's insistence on the power of 
art and the supremacy of the artist in volumes I and II. He comments that 
Flaubert was aware that the artist had to remain aloof from life, because 
if he became caught up in life, he ceased to see it clearly, and also that 
"nous autres, les artistes, nous sommes les aristocrates du bon Dieu"^''. 
Literature would then not only give Flaubert a way of not being a bourgeois, 
it would give him entry into an ^lite^^. 
14 Ibid, p. 1103. 
15 Ibid, p. 1601. 
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Sartre's philosophy of literature allows him to see the writer as 
a man of action, and to emphasise that the pen is mightier than the 
sword^^. He cleverly contrasts, through Flaubert's eyes, a great writer 
with a great soldier: 
"Or, c'est [Shakespeare]ce g^ant des lettres que Gustave 
compare tranqui1lement et malicieusement a son pire ennemi. 
Napoleon III. Par-dessus le march^, celui-ci a r^ussi en 
politique une oeuvre originale que 1'autre eOt pu cr^er en littgrature 
s'il avait su se resumer, ne jamais quitter le terrain litteraire. 
La superiority, en ce parall&le, revient done a I'empereur. Pas 
tout ^ fait: I'art de manier les hommes est de toute mani^re tellement 
inf^rieur ^ celui de manier les mots qu'il vaut mieux etre un Hugo qui 
manque parfois sa vraie cible qu'un Bonaparte qui fait mouche h tous 
les coups.^ 
This comparison allows Flaubert to develop his own political idea - that 
of the power of the individual, which is essentially diabolic, and on 
principle anti-bourgeois. 
Many critics have accused Sartre of formulating a godless theology; 
whilst he sought to do away with God, he in fact put man in God's place. 
In French thought from Descartes to Durkheim, perfect freedom belonged to 
God alone. Sartre, from his interpretation of the Cartesian phrase, 'cogito 
ergo sum', was totally unable to accept this. Therefore, he set out, in the 
Critique, an amplification of an idea previously set down in L'§tre et le 
ngant, that since man was a thinking creature and responsible for his own 
destiny, he was faced by only two moral possibilities, which Sartre named 
sadism and masochism. (These notions were derived from his wartime exper-
ience, when the only choice Sartre saw was between collaboration and resis-
tance.) In outlining these moral possibilities, he says that only sadism 
could be in good faith: 
16 Ibid, p. 1403. "[L'Art] n'a d'autre mission que de rendre vain le 
sacrifice de 1'Homme - c'est-^-dire du militaire." 
17 Ibid, V. 3, p. 457. 
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"The necessary violence of the party corresponded to the 
necessary violence of the existentially free individual, 
and was the only alternative to masochistic capitulation."^® 
Raymond Aron, however, detects a Pascalian atmosphere in Sartre's writing, 
which carries through from L'etre et le neant. He reads Sartre as accepting 
that the essential theme of philosophy is the relation of the solitary 
individual either to God or to the absence of God. This reading would 
seem to be substantiated in L'Idiot de la famille, by passages such as : 
"Gustave ne d^cidera jamais explicitement si la place d'honneur 
dans cet Empyr^e inf^rieur est r^serv^e h un hSte absent^iste et 
rechignd mais qui existe ou si, en supposant qu'il n'existe pas, 
c'est a lui-m§me de se hausser jusqu'au tr6ne et de s'y asseoir 
par la raison que le mouvement ascensionnel a, en soi, une valeur 
sacr^e."^' 
Sartre's philosophy of literature would seem to place the writer in direct 
communication with God; for inspiration, formerly, came from God. Hugo, 
for example, still claimed divine inspiration. However, Sartre claims, when 
Flaubert adopted the same notion, the idea reflected a certain madness. Men 
of the nineteenth century had questioned the existence of God, and many, 
influenced by science and technological inventions, denied His existence. 
Flaubert the writer felt the need to communicate; had he been a Hugo, his 
communication might have been with God. As it was, acknowledging the 
possible absence of God, Gustave's communication might then be with himself. 
Flaubert lived a great deal through situations created in his 
imagination. To be justified in this existence, he merely needed other 
people to believe him and to believe in him. Then, he could become 'eternal, 
18 Quoted by Raymond Aron in History and the dialectic of violence, p. 5. 
19 L'Idiot, p. 595. 
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omnipresent', he could look at the world from the 'point of view of the 
Absolute'^®. Sartre emphasises the imaginary nature of Flaubert's 
relationship with his father: 
"pour cr^er ce Seigneur imaginaire, Achille-Cl^ophas a fourni 
tous les mat^riaux - puissance et gloire, autorit^, savoir 
universel, pr^potence capricieuse, injuste justice - il n'a 
^t^ besoin que de les porter S I'absolu."^^ 
Flaubert's fantasies were thus founded on a sort of external reality. 
Sartre has made the reader question whether Flaubert ever existed 
in the real world, that is, whether he acted on 'political' institutions. 
In his discussion of power, he has shown how, to a certain extent, power 
for Flaubert resided in the sexual. He demonstrates how Flaubert admired 
the sadistic nature of others, and sought himself to be sadistic through 
his sexuality. Yet it was precisely through his sexuality that he was 
also masochistic. Beginning with his relationship with his mother, 
Sartre shows how Flaubert's masochism had its origins in his passive 
acceptance of the care of her hands. This relationship also showed that 
something was missing in Gustave's make up. His mother had wanted a 
daughter, and Gustave was lacking in the essential female quality. Through 
the power of imagination, he did his best to endow himself with feminine 
qualities. Referring to a process he described in his autobiography, where 
bestowing a name conferred qualities associated with that name, in other 
words, where a 'symbolic' action has a result in the 'political' world, 
Sartre discusses Flaubert's wish to be female: 
20 I ^ , P- 1561. 
21 Ibid, p. 1893. 
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"Certes, il peut griffoner - il I'a fait - sur un bout de 
papier: 'Je voudrais §tre femme', mais cela ne le m&nera pas 
loin. Comment jouir du 'deuxi^me sexe' ^ moins de se cr^er femme 
par les mots, avec un nom de femme, une vie, des moeurs, une 
condition, un destin de femme. 
According to Sartre, power would seem, for Flaubert, to reside in the 
feminine, partly because being female represented a condition desired by 
others, but also because Flaubert saw it as a motive force precipitating 
action. To disentangle the tortuous logic Sartre uses, it is essential 
to recall his belief that the feminine element is the passive, that to 
accept passivity is to accept failure, and that the masculine element is the 
active. Sartre claimed that "I'amante d^daign^e prend sa revanche en se 
faisant le g^niteur de son aim^: I'^criture est la virility de Gustave"^^. 
In other words, the feminine element becomes dominant, and produces a 
literary act, which may be seen as failure, a refusal to act, in the real 
worl d. 
Nonetheless, writing does constitute an action in the real world. Sartre 
considers this 'femininity' destructive, because the decision to act through 
the imagination and literature prevents man from acting directly on the real 
world. He expands on this notion of the destructive nature of the feminine, 
in an attempt to add a further dimension to his explanation of the failure 
of the Second Empire. Sartre suggests that, for Flaubert, the feminine 
element which brought about the downfall of the Second Empire had two 
aspects; the first is an animal quality dominant over all class and breeding, 
exemplified in the following quotation: 
22 Ibid, p. 951. 
23 Ibid, p. 1089. 
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"D'une certaine mani^re, si I'on en croit Flaubert, la femme 
est une b§te dress^e qui joue un r61e ou, si I'on pr^f&re, c'est 
, une femelle en perp^tuelle instance de dermal isation. Sous la 
'grande dame catholique', sous la 'bourgeoise' et sous la 
'lorette' qui ne sont que des r61es nous retrouvons le m§me 
animal exasp^rant et bornd. Pour aller jusqu'au bout toute grande 
dame est fausse, comme sont fausses les bonnes bourgeoises et les 
catins; et n'importe quelle femelle selon les circonstances, sera 
Eugenie ou la Paiva ou la femme du grand fr^re Achille. Seules 
seront vraies les "bonnes filles" truculentes comme Lagier qui, 
loin de la dissimuler, tirent leur ggnie de 1'exhibition de leur 
animalit^: celles-l& font horreur sous 1'Empire parce que la 
Femme rfegne et qu'elle interdit, de crainte qu'on ne la d^masque, 
tout abandon h la nature, toute recherche de la v^rit^."^** 
The second is linked to the notion that faith is a female characteristic, 
and that in the context of Flaubert's society, faith automatically meant 
belief in Catholicism. By associating Catholicism, the Church and Woman, 
Sartre is able to demonstrate how Flaubert might have believed woman 
responsible for the fall of the Empire: 
"Car la fable du monde, chez la femme, cet imaginaire souill^ qu'elle 
prend ou veut prendre pour la r^alit^, c'est le catholicisme . . . La 
boucle est boucl^e: c'est I'Eglise qui a perdu la France, c'est elle, 
la vaincue de Sedan; c'est la femme, complice par essence du 
parti-pr^tre, qui a perdu 1'Empereur."^^ 
The parallel between the failure of Flaubert, because of his belief in 
the feminine, and the failure of Louis Napoleon for what Sartre sees as 
fundamentally the same reason, serves as a further link between the two 
men, and allows Sartre to state with some conviction that "de m§mes 
motivations historiques ont produit ces deux ^piph^nom&nes". 
24 Ibid, v. 3, p. 619. 
25 Ibid, v. 3, p. 621. 
26 Ibid, v. 3, p. 651. 
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Sartre would like the reader to believe that he has objectively (and 
imaginatively) studied the society in which Flaubert lived, and that he 
has been able to present the operations o f that society through the 
actions of individuals. However, he cannot be said to have achieved 
this aim. All societies contain two types of institutions - political 
and symbolic. Power relations and symbolic formations, as Cohen points 
out, are not reducible one to the other; they interact, each having its 
own intrinsic values. A close examination of Sartre's study of Flaubert 
and his social milieu will reveal that Sartre did not maintain the 
autonomy of the two systems. His political system is based in his 
symbolic system. When all is said and done, the work revolves around 
the relationship between Flaubert and God, or the absence of God, and 
Flaubert's process of identification with the Godhead^^ Sartre has 
Flaubert play both the role of the humble servant and the Almighty quite 
successfully. This is brought out succinctly in the chapter and section 
headings of L'Idiot de la famille, as well as in frequently used phrases. 
'Loser wins', for example, not only sums up Flaubert's manner of being 
outstanding; it also repeats the biblical notion of 'the last shall be 
first' and 'blessed is the lowly for his is the kingdom of heaven'. 
Furthermore, the notion of 'loser wins' is linked with the ambiguous 
term 'hypostasis', which in metaphysics is applied to an underlying substance 
but which in theology is used to refer to the personality of Christ, or the 
person of the Godhead. Thus, once again, an action or series of actions in 
the real world is seen to stem from a belief in the symbolic order. 
27 Ibid, p. 595. 
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In all his writings, Sartre has attempted to place emphasis on the 
active. The heroes in his literary works are men who act, who have the 
courage of their convictions; the same is true of the men he highlights 
in his political works. In L'Idiot de la fami lie, Sartre again attempts 
to base the constitution of man's identity in real or political action; the 
reader soon becomes aware that the enterprise is doomed to failure. Sartre 
cannot hope to show Flaubert (or any man within this work) acting in the 
real world, because the work itself is based in a denial of reality; he 
ultimately imagines many of the circumstances which allow his Flaubert to 
act. Therefore, it can be seen that Sartre's Flaubert is at least as 
guilty of the denial of reality with which Sartre charged Gustave Flaubert; 
thus Sartre himself is guilty. Flaubert, however, did act, in that he 
created works of literature which are generally considered highly 
successful. We may remember that Sartre saw literary creation as failure, 
because it constituted a passive role. However, it suffices to consider 
the success of Sartre's own literary works, above all artistically, and to 
bear in mind that he often remarked on L' Idiot de la famiHe as his last great 
literary work, to become aware of the fact that Sartre himself had much the 
same desire as Flaubert - to create works of literature. The difference 
between the creative acts of these writers is that Sartre, according to his 
own philosophy, was aware that writing constituted a kind of failure; and 
yet, this 'failure' itself may be the desired end and its achievement -
that is, the perfect execution of a passive action, or of an action in the 
imagined world - success. 
THE THEFT OF LANGUAGE; SARTRE, FLAUBERT AND COMMUNICATION 
L'Idiot de la famille is an exposition of Sartre's views on language, 
and in particular the language of praxis. -He discusses in detail the use 
of language, 'commitment' and the difference in levels of communication 
between the prose writer and the poet. He also investigates the reading 
process, which he sees as interacting dialectically with the writing 
process. 
Qu'est-ce que la 1ittgrature?, written when Sartre was intensely 
concerned with political commitment and action, demonstrated his belief 
in the primacy of action in all fields. In the twenty-five years between 
its publication and the appearance of the third volume of L'Idiot de la 
famille, he modified his position slightly, within the framework of his 
philosophy, but the insistence on the need for commitment remained. 
Qu'est-ce que la littdrature? shows clearly the influence of Marxism-
Leninism. Sartre's demand that style in prose should be unobtrusive, and 
his expectation that good prose should be aesthetically pleasing, are 
reminiscent of the views of Marx himself. The assertion that prose alone 
is a valid form of expression is founded in Lenin's 1905 pronouncement on 
party literature, which gave the writer an important role to play in 
society^. Sartre emphasised this point when he wrote^ that the function 
of the writer was to make sure that no one was ignorant of the world around 
him, and that no one could say it did not concern him. The reader is, 
however, also aware of the influence of Trotsky's rather more Romantic 
1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, v. 10, pp. 44-49, "Party organisation 
and party literature." 
2 Qu'est-ce que la 1itterature?, p. 74. 
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views^; this influence is evidenced by the fact that Sartre, even 
in this work, concedes the value of the artistic act. Trotsky had 
insisted on the importance of literature in any established society. 
He had stated that artistic creations flourished only in times of peace 
and prosperity. In particular, he felt that the writer, like all 
revolutionaries, had to be engaged in perpetual revolution. In Qu'est-ce 
que la 1itt^rature?, Sartre took up these points: 
"L'^crivain consomme et ne produit pas, meme s'il a decide de 
servir par la plume les inter§ts de la communaute . . . II ne 
peut en aller diff^remment, car son activite est inutile: il 
n'est pas du tout utile, il est parfois nuisible que la society 
prenne conscience d'elle-m§me. . . L'ecrivain presente [h la 
socigtejson image, il la somme de I'assumer ou de se changer . . . 
Ainsi l'ecrivain donne a la societe une conscience malheureuse, de ce 
fait il est en perpetuel antagonisme avec les forces conservatrices 
qui maintiennent I'equilibre qu'il tend a rompre. Car le passage 
au mediat qui ne peut se faire que par negation de I'immediat est 
une perpetuelle revolution"'^. 
L'Idiot de la fami lie is fundamentally concerned with Flaubert's 
project, his commitment to be a writer, and touches indirectly on the 
points mentioned above. Sartre conceded in Qu'est-ce que la 1 ittgrature?^ 
that the poet could be committed: 
"Si done I'on veut absolument parler de I'engagement du poete, 
disons que c'est I'homme qui s'engage a perdre. C'est le sens 
profond de ce guignon, de cette malediction dont il se reclame 
toujours et qu'il attribue toujours a une intervention de I'exterieur, 
alors que c'est son choix le plus profond, non pas la consequence mais 
la source de sa poesie. II est certain de I'echec total de I'entreprise 
humaine et s'arrange pour echouer dans sa propre vie, afin de temoigner, 
par sa d^faite singuliere, de la defaite humaine en general." 
3 L. Trotsky, Literature and revolution, Ann Arbor, Ann Arbor paperbacks 
for the study of Communism and Marxism, 1960. 
4 Qu'est-ce que la 1itt^rature?, p. 129. 
5 Ibid, p. 87, n. 4. 
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In L' Idiot de la f a m H l e , the commitment of the poet is accepted as 
justifiable and valid. Sartre expresses Flaubert's commitment as a 
positive attempt to fail, and elaborates this into a theme which runs 
through the entire work. 
In the Critique, Sartre had discussed language as praxis. He had 
described it as an inert materiality which circulated rather like money, 
and which forged the link between men. It was the way a man had of conveying 
his project to another - through words. Flaubert's relationship to language 
is of considerable importance in determining, in Sartre's terms, his project. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that much of volume I of L'Idiot de la famille 
is concerned with Flaubert's acquisition of and relationship to language. 
Sartre gives us to understand that Flaubert was slow in learning to speak, and 
that he parroted words, rather than uttering them in full comprehension of 
their meaning. His relationship to reading was much the same: he did not 
need to transform the ciphers because somebody could do it for him, and yet 
he was fully aware that the ciphers would communicate a message to him. 
Sartre has refined the notion of man's relationship to language rather 
more crudely expressed in Qu'est-ce que la litterature? where he maintained 
that each man found himself in one of two positions vis-a-vis language: 
"L'homme qui parle est au-del^ des mots, pres de I'objet; le po^te 
est en deg^. Le po^te est hors du langage, il voit les mots ^ 
I'envers, comme s'il n'appartenait pas a la condition humaine et 
que venant vers les hommes, il recontrSt d'abord la parole comme 
une barri^re. Au lieu de connattre d'abord les choses par leur 
nom, il semble qu'il ait d'abord un contact silencieux avec elles."^ 
6 Ibid, pp. 64-65. 
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In L'Idlot de la famllle, language is still regarded as both a means of 
communication and as poetic - that is, each word contains a microcosm^ 
However, the two aspects may now be present-in the language of one man: 
"Le mot, Chez Gustave, apparatt ^ la lettre comme un hal1ucinatoire 
mais non point en agissant sur les couches profondes du vecu: 
(. . . )sa fonction est double: d'une part il stoppe et refl^chit 
sur elles-m§mes les passions vraies ou feintes qui s'y engouffrent 
comme s'il ^tait leur objet en chair et en os, d'autre part, il 
s'offre comme 1'index tendu qui d^signe un horizon, comme un 
signal orientant et d^finissant une qu§te."® 
Language itself may be presented in two forms, spoken and written, 
with the spoken word being equated with an expression of Faith, the 
feminine element, and the written word with an expression of Science, 
the masculine element. Sartre's terminology becomes confusing at this 
point. It is important to remember the difference between the notion 
'parler' in the senses of 'agir' and 'la transmission orale'. Sartre 
comments^ that in literate societies and among literate individuals, every 
dealing with the printed word is audio-visual, although one aspect will 
always outweigh the other. 
"Quel que soit le message, la transmission orale comporte 
toujours une part de representation done de pathos: parler, 
c'est souvent un acte mais celui-ci se transforme en geste a 
la premiere difficulte. Pour Gustave, c'est le pathos pur: 
il n'use jamais de sa voix pour raisonner, il s'exhibe en 
elle comme passivity constitute."^° 
7 Ibid, p. 67. 
8 L'Idiot, pp. 923-924. 
9 Ibid, p. 868. 
10 Ibid, p. 870. 
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Play-acting was, in Flaubert's childhood, one of his methods of self-
expression. On the stage, in dramatic presentations, certain conventions 
are respected, but the actor always needs the complicity of an audience 
to confer a meaning on the words he uses. The same is true of the reading 
of a novel. Here, the reader/audience accepts certain conventions, and 
usually creates from the inert materiality of the printed word a world 
fairly similar to that created by the writer. However, the reader is 
free to come to the literary work with a different outlook, and may create 
from the printed page a world quite different from that imagined by the 
author. Madame Bovary, read by the bourgeoisie under the Second Empire, 
is an example of such an occurrence. 
Culler, in Flaubert: the uses of uncertainty, discusses the problem 
of reading. His views are similar to those of Sartre, although more clearly 
expressed; they may also be readily applied to Sartre's own work. He 
states that : 
"the problem of reading is crucial because our notions of what to do 
when confronted with a text are the major constituents of the 
institution of literature. The meaning of a work is clearly not 
the sum of the meanings of its sentences; to 'understand' a work 
requires more than knowledge of a language. The institution of 
literature is a repository of conventions and assumptions, 
expectations and interpretive operations, which enable readers to 
take up a text, order it, and produce meaning from that ordering. 
An author writes within and at times against the set of conventions 
of reading which he takes to be operative in his culture, and to 
understand the form within which he is writing one must attempt 
to make explicit the expectations and procedures of readers which 
it presupposes. And when the novel has become self-conscious and 
problematic, then the expectations and interpretive operations of 
readers become doubly important, for they constitute, in one sense, 
its subject: to read the novel is to observe the ways in which it 
frustrates one's attempts to make sense of it."^^ 
11 J. Culler, Flaubert: the uses of uncertainty, London, Elek, 1974, 
pp. 18-19. 
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The act of reading by a committed individual is likely to involve certain 
critical attitudes. In Qu'est-ce que la 1itt^rature?, Sartre describes 
the relationship between writing and reading as dialectical. The two 
interconnected acts require two separate agents. It is the joint effort 
of the author and the reader which makes this imaginary yet concrete thing, 
which constitutes a work of the mind, arise. Reading is thus defined as 
the synthesis between perception and creation^^. However, in the same way 
as Sartre modified his view of man's relation to language, so he altered his 
ideas on the reading process. 
The distinction which Sartre makes between these two processes is that 
one, which may be designated 'reading', involves perception and creation, 
and the other, 're-reading', involves imagination and creation^^ 'Reading' 
is an attempt to transform a thing into an idea^\ whereas 're-reading' is 
the destruction of the act of reading and its replacement by the dream or 
the imagined^^ Apparently, Flaubert spent a great deal of time reading 
works he had already read. (Enid Starkie^^ viewing this action in relation 
to the world, commented on the obvious superficiality of these readings.) 
Sartre sees in them another instance of Flaubert's incapacity or refusal to 
face the real world. By reading a book again, Flaubert was able to make a 
mockery of time: both author and reader were suspended in eternity, or a 
kind of timelessness, where masterpieces became part of a cyclical pattern, 
repeated at will. He was also able, by using his imagination, to give new 
12 Qu'est-ce que la 1ittgrature?, pp. 91-105. 
13 L'Idiot, p. 2080. 
14 IbjA^ p. 51. 
15 I ^ , P- 2047. 
16 Enid Starkie, Flaubert; the making of the master, London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1967. 
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life to pre-existing forms and produce and re-produce in literary form 
various life-like situations. 
For Flaubert, as for Sartre, the subject of literature had to be 
everything, and each work, whatever its length, had to say all there was 
to say. Flaubert insisted on the necessity of including details which 
might seem irrelevant to the larger concept of the work, but which in fact 
contributed to the construction of the larger framework. Sartre, similarly, 
in L'Idiot de la famille, observes and records seemingly insignificant 
details. He adopts a convention of the anti-novel by refusing to highlight 
certain aspects, thereby granting them a status they may not have had at 
the time. The reader may have felt swamped by the plethora of detail in 
the first two volumes. Sartre indicates his possible intention in a section 
heading towards the end of the second volume. This heading^^, Gustave 
Flaubert de 45 ^ 47, is reminiscent of a film title, Cleo de 5 a 7; the 
film lasted exactly two hours, and showed the audience what a young girl 
did one evening. Each person watching the film was able to decide which 
were the significant factors in Clio's life. The reader of L'Idiot de la 
famille is encouraged to do likewise and is thus allowed to maintain his 
own creative freedom. 
Sartre appears to accept Flaubert's commitment as an expression of 
his relationship to the world around him; however he did launch two 
criticisms. He has stated on a number of occasions that he could feel 
only antipathy towards the novelistic creations of Flaubert, (It would 
appear that he did not consider these characters or settings poorly drawn, 
17 L'Idiot, p. 2013. 
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but rather that they were so well drawn as to exact a positive reaction 
to the type of person portrayed - in the case of Flaubert's literary 
characters, people whose values are totally'opposed to Sartre's.) 
Sartre also criticised Flaubert's view of the creative process. He himself 
believed man found inspiration in the world around him, in the actions and 
creations of other men, and that the ultimate relationship was with another 
human being. However, he maintained that for nineteenth century writers, 
inspiration was a divine gift. He had already made us aware of what, in 
his view, was Flaubert's ambiguous relationship to the divinity. 
Therefore, even if for Flaubert there was no God, the source of literature 
would still be found in some "unobservable". Thus Sartre was able to claim 
that, since Flaubert wrote as the omniscient narrator, from the point of 
view of the Absolute, he had set himself up as the source of divine 
inspiration, as God in relation to his own literary creations. 
In the preface to Nathalie Sarraute's Portrait d'un inconnu, Sartre 
discussed the relationship of the author to his work. He claimed^® that 
by allowing us to sense an intangible authenticity, by showing us the 
constant coming and going from the particular to the general, by tenaciously 
depicting the reassuring, dreary world of the inauthentic, Mme Sarraute 
had achieved a technique which made it possible to attain, over and beyond 
the psychological, human reality in its very existence. To do this, she 
distinguished three spheres of generality: a) the sphere of character; 
b) the sphere of moral commonplace; c) the sphere of art. Sartre works within 
18 J-P. Sartre, 'Portrait d'un inconnu', in Situations IV, Paris, 
Gallimard, 1964, pp. 10-11. 
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these spheres of generality in L'Idiot de la famille, placing his 
characters very firmly in relation to these spheres of operation, and at 
the same time allowing a glimpse of his own'situation. The ambiguity of 
the position of the writer as purveyor of the whole truth is linked with 
the question Sartre posed at the beginning of L'Idiot de la famille: 
'What can we know of a man today?' According to one aspect of Sartre's 
philosophy of literature, the author's presence should not intrude into 
the work; according to another, the presence will necessarily be felt, as 
it will determine the perspective of the novel, since the author is 
'situated'. As Curtis remarks^^: 
"Sacr^ romancier! On a beau essayer de I'escamoter, il est 
toujours 1^. Mais enfin, I'essentiel est qu'il n'attire pas 
I'attention du lecteur sur lui par des fagons trop indiscrfetes." 
And indeed Sartre the novelist does remain relatively discreet. It may be 
alleged that he carries his discretion to the point where he confuses his 
readers. There are numerous passages in L'Idiot de la famille where it is 
impossible to discover whether the views expressed are those actually 
expressed by Flaubert; those Flaubert might have expressed, interpreted 
by Sartre; or those of Sartre. Sartre the biographer would probably 
explain this as evidence of the empathy existing between the writer and 
his subject. Sceptical readers could contend that this is either evidence 
of Sartre's imagination, or that Sartre chose to represent Flaubert in a 
particular light so that he could express his own superiority over his 
subject. 
19 Jean-Louis Curtis, 'Sartre et le roman', in Les critiques de notre 
temps et Sartre, Paris, G a m i e r , 1973, p. 67. 
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Through his belief in the writer as purveyor of all truth, and 
because of his attitude towards Flaubert and the nineteenth century, 
Sartre was able to reconstruct his notion of the literary process as 
expressed in Qu'est-ce que la litterature? so that it accounted for 
masterpieces, for works of art. In opposition to the Poet, who, it will 
be remembered, stood in opposition to the Prose writer, Sartre introduced 
the Artist. 
"Entre artiste et pofete, une immense difference: I'un sent, 
1'autre parle, I'un est le coeur, I'autre est la tete."^° 
Literature, or any other product of the Artist will be unworldly. Yet 
it will follow worldly rules. For Flaubert, as for Sartre, literature 
has everything as its subject, and should say all there is to say. The 
unifying factor in disparate situations will be language, or rather the 
use of language, according to Flaubert, for Flaubert saw Beauty in the 
form of the expression. He became known as an exponent of Art for Art's 
sake, subscribing to the view that it is not what he says that conveys the 
thought of the Artist, but the way in which he says it. Sartre considered, 
in L'Idiot de la fami lie, that it was impossible to achieve Beauty through 
the use of language. In an interview^\ after the publication of L' Idiot 
de la famille, he said that in this work he was not concerned with producing 
a literary style; any style to be found would result from the subject matter 
under discussion; the subject matter should be able to produce its own unity. 
Furthermore, his aim was to show a method and a man, rather than to produce 
a work of 1iterature. 
20 L'Idiot, p. 1484. 
21 'Sur L'Idiot de la famille', in Situations X, Paris, Gallimard, 1976. 
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It is generally accepted that Sartre was influenced by Schopenhauer. 
Schopenhauer's belief that there are two sorts of author, those who write 
for the sake of their subject and those who write for the sake of writing, 
is mirrored by Sartre's belief in committed writing, rather than Art for 
Art's sake. Another aspect of Schopenhauer's thought sometimes mirrored 
by Sartre is to be found in their opinions of lengthy works. Schopenhauer 
argued that long-windedness was often used to put off the 'nascetur ridiculus 
mus', whilst Sartre stated that, when Critique de la raison dialectique was 
published, logically Question de methode should have come after the main 
body of the work; however, he placed it first for fear that it should 
appear that a mountain had brought forth a mouse. When challenged on the 
length of L'Idiot de la famille^^, Sartre replied that the book had been 
written as the words sprang to mind, because the simplest and most fluent 
form was best. This is not really a valid answer to the criticism. Large 
sections of the work appear muddled and loosely argued. Some parts, 
particularly in volume II, seem to be transcriptions of recorded discussions, 
or possibly to have been dictated, because of the loose, occasionally 
incoherent sentence structure, and the errors which may be typographical 
and the result of poor proof-reading, but which may also be the result of 
confusing homophones such as et/est and encrage/ancrage^^. 
The whole seems contrived to mystify and to warrant the use of 
Schopenhauer's argument on long-windedness. Sartre supports the hypothesis 
22 Sur L'Idiot, p. 93. 
23 That these sections may have been dictated or transcribed from 
recordings only became apparent to me after my reading, and in 
another context. In a work of the length and complexity of 
L'Idiot de la fami lie, one may expect occasional typographical 
errors; therefore I did not make a note of the odd constructions. 
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that L'Idiot de 1a famllle was intended to mystify in an interview given 
to L' Idiot International^'*. The interviewer asked whether Sartre's 
cultural views had been changed by the events of May 1968 in France. 
His reply is worth quoting at length: 
"Le problfeme que je pose dans mon cas, un intellectuel de 65 ans 
qui, depuis 25-27 ans a dans la tete d'ecrire un Flaubert, 
c'est-^-dire d'utiliser les methodes connues, scientifiques 
si vous voulez, en tout cas analytiques, etc., pour etudier 
un homme. Vient mai 68. Qa fait dej^ 15 annees que je 
travaille, que je suis dedans. Qu'est-ce je dois faire? 
Abandonner? fa n'a pas de sens, et pourtant, je ne sais 
plus qui disait cela, "les quarante volumes de Lenine 
repr^sentent une oppression pour les masses", ce qu'on 
peut croire sur parole car les masses n'ont ni le temps, 
ni les moyens actuellement d'aborder ce type de connaissance 
qui est une connaissance d'intel1ectuel. Alors, que faire? 
Ce problfeme est precis et pratique: que faire quand on est 
depuis quinze ans sur un livre, que finalement on est rest6 
dans une certaine mesure le meme parce qu'on n'abandonne pas 
toute son enfance, etc. Que faire? J'ai decide de I'achever, 
mais du fait que je I'ach^ve, je reste sur le plan de I'ancien 
intellectuel 
In other words, in spite of his statements over the years, on the subject 
of literature and the writer influencing society, and addressing themselves 
to the man in the street, Sartre indicates that he never really moved far 
from an elitist position, writing ultimately for himself. 
Les mots was the title Sartre gave his autobiography. Words have been 
the concern of Sartre's entire life. Words were also the life-long concern 
of Flaubert. Sartre criticised Flaubert, because as he stated in L'Idiot 
de la f a m i n e , Flaubert's project was to "vole[r] le langage aux hommes, 
[le ddtourner] de ses fins pratiques, asservir sa mati^re ^ rendre par 
elle-.m6me des imaginaires inarticulables"^^ The consequence of this action 
24 J-P. Sartre, 'L'ami du peuple', interview in L'Idiot International, 
no. 103, September 1970. 
25 L'Idiot, p. 1618. 
- 6 1 -
was that: 
"vous aurez incarng dans vos phrases le p61e de toute imagination, 
le Beau ou le Mai radical, en faisant -sentir ^ propos du langage 
que le monde est produit et soutenu par une liberte maligne. Le 
style c'est le silence du discours, le silence dans le discours, 
le but imaginaire et secret de la parole ecrite."^^ 
Yet, as several critics have pointed out^'^, in L'Idiot de la famille alone, 
Sartre probably published more words than Flaubert did in his entire life. 
In an attempt to communicate his own project, Sartre himself could be 
said to have stolen language, and diverted it from its practical ends. 
Flaubert's works do not suffer the fate of being left unread on library 
shelves, as Sartre had predicted for the literary productions of many 
nineteenth century writers. Aronson states that L'Idiot de la famille 
"should not be read, and except for Sartre's friends, a few 
Sartre or Flaubert scholars, or PhD candidates in search of 
a new field to explore, it won't be. Why? Because it can't 
be. L'Idiot de la famille violates elementary rules of human 
communication which the political Sartre expressed so well in 
What is Literature? It has no respect for the reader, and makes 
impossible demands on him; it is undisciplined, self-indulgent, 
boring and unreal. 
The unreal was the aspect of Flaubert's life which Sartre criticised 
most strongly. However, an examination of L'Idiot de la famille will show 
that the entire work is based on the imaginary. If the reader compares 
Sartre's position on commitment and the writer as outlined in Qu'est-ce que 
la littgrature? and in the Critique, with that put forward in L'Idiot de la 
famille, he becomes aware that there is no real change to the broader 
concepts of the theory, although there are slight modifications to the 
details. What has changed is the framework. Sartre has moved from the 
26 
27 These include Levin and Aronson. 
28 Ronald Aronson, 'L'Idiot de la famille: the ultimate Sartre?' in 
Telos, no. 20, Summer 1974, p. 100. 
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real world of the Europe of the twentieth century to his own view of the 
nineteenth. In other words, he has moved into the realm of the imaginary, 
as he himself acknowledged, when he described the work as 'une fable'. 
He has done this with all the scholarly impulse he formerly vested in his 
political writings. Aronson views the author of L'Idiot de la famil1e as 
'the ultimate Sartre'. "It should be obvious that his entire career has 
led to this imaginary study of the interior of an imaginary person." ^^ 
Language, in Sartre's philosophy, has always been fundamental to 
relations between men, forming a most elementary bond, and allowing a 
statement of each man's praxis to be made. Whilst on the one hand 
accepting Flaubert's praxis, Sartre condemns it because it "stole 
language from men", prevented them from communicating. Sartre himself 
is also guilty of the theft of language; as well as of false representation. 
His supposed attempt to represent the real world of the nineteenth century 
is nothing more than the production of a figment of his imagination, and 
even the attempt to communicate this image may be seen as a failure. 
29 Ibid, p. 107. 
A CRIME COMMITTED AGAINST WHOM? 
L'IDIOT DE LA FAMILLE AS A NOVEL 
Sartre insisted that a good novel should be like a detective story. 
One's initial reaction to this is that by reading the book, one will 
learn who committed some immoral or illegal act and how. Sartre's 
statement that in L'Idiot de la famille he wanted to 'show a man' would 
seem to bear this out, if this man is to be he who stole language. Yet 
the reader would be mistaken if he saw this as the only aspect of a 
detective story. Sartre also intended to 'show a method'. In this 
case, he has given us insights into how a detective goes about gathering 
clues, and how he makes inferences from these clues. 
He had spoken of L'Idiot de la famil1e as a work of fiction^ and 
expressed the hope that it would be considered 'un roman vrai'. Claude 
Mouchard^ points out that the phrase a 'true novel' implies two quite 
distinct demands - representing the specific time of the hero's life and 
the time for questions and methodical reflection, lived time and logical 
time. Culler describes the novel as 'an ironic form, born of the discrepancy 
between meaning and experience, whose source of value lies in the interest 
of exploring that gap and filling it, while knowing that any claim to have 
filled it derives from blindness^. Serge Doubrovsky agrees that a novel 
cannot be true. He picks up an image used by Sartre in Qu'est-ce que la 
1ittgrature? Here, Sartre described literature as a dialectical process 
which, like a spinning-top, exists only in movement"*. Doubrovsky comments 
1 'Sur L'Idiot' , p. 94. 
2 Claude Mouchard, 'Un roman vrai', in Critique, v. 27, December 1971, 
p. 1029. 
3 Culler, p. 24. 
4 Qu'est-ce que la 1ittgrature?, p. 91. 
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that L'Idiot de 1a fam111e is as fragile as a top whilst it is spinning. 
No sooner has the reader managed to fix on one of the many aspects of the 
work than Sartre upsets the balance, and the illusion is shattered. In 
asking us to accept his work as a 'true novel', Sartre is trying to 
embroil us further. There is indeed truth, 'fact', in L'Idiot de la fami lie, 
but a true novel cannot be discovered. The truth of a fiction never comes 
from some external point of reference, but from an internal cohesion; it 
is therefore fictitious. A real novel is full of falsehoods. A true 
novel is not a novel at all. Doubrovsky concludes that Sartre's only 
choice is to write a 'quasi-roman quasi vrai'^. 
The critics agree that whatever else the study might be, even in 
Sartre's terms it cannot be dubbed a novel. This is partly because as 
Levin points out® Sartre is never the disinterested observer. He is 
justified in the criticism that Sartre is less concerned to canvass the 
facts or to understand the situation than to pass dogmatic and facile 
judgements on human behaviour at large. Throughout L'Idiot de la famille, 
Sartre constructs a picture of Flaubert as a hypersensitive individual, the 
son crushed by the dominating father. Levin suggests that this picture is 
less a result of careful observation, of the sort that Flaubert himself would 
have engaged in, than of the influence of Kafka, especially through the 
Metamorphosis, which has etched the pattern of the dominating father/crushed 
son relationship in twentieth century consciousness. For Flaubert is in 
fact known to have been an affectionate son and a devoted uncle; he is also 
5 Serge Doubrovsky, 'Une Strange toupie', in Les critiques de notre temps 
et Sartre. 
6 Harry Levin, 'A literary enormity: Sartre on Flaubert', in Journal of the 
History of Ideas, v. 33, no. 4, 1972, p. 644. 
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recognised to have been a congenial companion, especially on his visits 
to Paris. It would be wrong to imply that Sartre has fabricated an entire 
life for Flaubert, based on nothing but his"own moral position. He refers 
constantly to Flaubert's early writings, regarding these productions of 
adolescence as mirrors of the soul. He also quotes repeatedly from 
Flaubert's correspondence of both youth and maturity. On this evidence, he 
concludes that Flaubert was a man who sought all his life to deny the bourgeois 
he had been born, Starkie, referring also to the correspondence, shows 
Flaubert as a bourgeois, accepting his condition, although railing against 
the bourgeoisie as a class. 
Sartre may be seen to have adopted a method of Flaubert's: 'imagining 
the real', although in using it, he did the opposite of what Flaubert 
would have done. Flaubert used imagination to present a more easily 
understood truth, whereas Sartre in L'Idiot de la famille, used imagination 
to overcome the real. 
Sartre has made many comments on the novelistic form over the years. 
He has written novels, as well as philosophical treatises and political 
articles, and is obviously aware of differences in approach and style. 
Without doubt, he would like to think that his philosophical and political 
texts have greatest clarity and import for his readers, and yet had to 
admit that 'curiously enough' his literary manner of writing was the clearest^ 
It may have been this realisation which led him to modify his position on the 
prose writer and the poet, for in the same interview, he said that the prose 
writer can never after all be purely and simply a man who points things out, 
who designates things. Also in this article, Sartre attempted to set the 
7 'L'^crivain et sa langue', p. 44. 
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novel aside from other types of prose writing as 'some kind of essay but 
one which is going to contain emotional as well as reasoned argument'®. 
As Jean-Louis Curtis points out^, Sartre has always tried to emphasise 
the fact that the only type of novel perfectly adapted to the demands of 
our time is the 'situation novel'. Whereas, in Sartre's eyes, writers of 
past ages felt it possible to remove themselves spiritually from their 
own time, today's writers are very aware of the world in which they live, 
and therefore they can only write 'situation novels' with neither internal 
narrator nor omniscient witness. Furthermore, Sartre had always felt a 
certain distaste for the formal untruths and distortions which art entailed. 
He took as a model of the ideal novel the work of Saint-Exupery, whose novels 
of aviation centred on the 
"technical relationship of men to things, in which objects are 
neither described in an objective, contemplative way, nor 
irrealised, but transcended toward their use, revealed by 
their position in the human project itself. And the aesthetic 
formula behind such a work is neither that of static description 
nor of poetic irrealisation but rather that expressed as an 
artistic law by Valery, namely that the density of a literary 
object is in direct proportion to the multiplicity of relation-
ships it entertains with other elements of the work."^° 
The influence of Marxist literary critical theory is obvious in Sartre's 
statement of the expression of the relationship of men to things. Sartre 
was, however, striving after a Utopian ideal. In L'Idiot de la famil1e, 
he attempts to work out Gustave Flaubert's relationship to his father, and 
to society under the Second Empire. Society, however, does not operate 
8 Ibid, p. 56. 
9 Curtis, in Les critiques, p. 64. 
10 Frederic Jameson, 'Three methods in Sartre's literary criticism', in J. K. 
Simon, ed.. Modern French Criticism, Chicago, Chicago U.P., 1972, p. 213. 
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mechanically, and any attempts to make it do so must either be doomed to 
failure, or be seen as expressions of a fantasy existence. The model of 
the novel of aviation seems very definitely strained when applied to the 
life of a person. 
Sartre was also firmly in favour of the so-called 'anti-novel'^^. 
It is interesting to compare his opinions on the work of Mme Sarraute with 
his own ultimate novelistic creation. The anti-novel, according to Sartre, 
maintains the appearances and outlines of the ordinary novel, and can be 
classified as work of the imagination with fictitious characters, whose 
story they tell. However, it differs from the ordinary novel in that its 
aim is to make the reader more aware of the novel in order to challenge it, 
to destroy it before our very eyes, whilst in fact seeming to construct it. 
The anti-novel should read like a detective story. Attention has already 
been drawn to Sartre's interest in detective stories, and his concurrence 
with Simone de Beauvoir in her definition of a real novel. 
He opposed the type of story recounted by the old-fashioned storyteller, 
which emphasised present and past acts, partly because this form of 
narrative not only suggested that all facts were known to the storyteller, 
but that there was some order of priority inherent in the events and a 
causal relationship between the facts recounted. However, within his own 
'novel', he not only fabricated a 'r^cit', he also sought to impose a 
perspective through a theoretical framework. Mouchard believes that a 
11 He expressed these views in the preface to Nathalie Sarraute's Portrait 
d'un inconnu, which appeared in Situations IV. 
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novel is successful when the various aspects form a whole; if in L'Idiot 
de la f a m i n e the story and the theory hold together, it is probably only 
because Flaubert's texts are included and act as a "solid, unifying 
cement"^^. 
Sartre praised Nathalie Sarraute for her integrity in seeking to 
safeguard her sincerity as a storyteller. He commented that she took her 
characters neither from within nor from without, because she realised that 
we are 'both for ourselves and for others, entirely within and without at the 
same time.' Sartre himself, in L'Idiot de la fami lie, in that he was 
dealing with people who had existed in the real world rather than characters 
who were entirely creations of his imagination, attempted to take his 
characters from both within and without at the same time. He tried to 
present the psychological motivations as well as the objective situation. 
The time taken to establish the inner workings of a person's mind, as well 
as to describe his relationship with the external world, mean that it is 
very difficult for the reader to imagine the character actually 'situated' 
and thus the attempts to present a character both from within and from without 
are rarely successful. One notable exception is Sartre's depiction of 
Achille-Cleophas at the time when Gustave's nervous troubles appear to 
have started. He presents a concerned father genuinely worried about his 
son's health and about his future in a competitive world. This may in fact 
be the only glimpse of human relations in the entire work. There may be 
others. The entire work does resemble the imagined detective's notebook, 
and the reader is invited to survey the clues gathered together. The task 
is exacting, given the amount of material to be sifted, and any interpretation 
12 Mouchard, in Les critiques, p. 1042. 
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is always personal. Sartre tries to maintain his integrity as a story-
teller, as there is no obvious omniscient narrator, and thus there seems 
to be no 'right answer'. 
Sartre's approach in L'Idiot de la famille may in fact appear 
dramatic rather than novelistic. Frederic Jameson devoted part of 
Sartre: the origins of a style to showing that Sartre's style is inherently 
melodramatic. Without taking into account the titles Sartre bestows on 
his characters, such as 'the knights of nothingness', and the roles in 
which they are cast, the overall impression is very much of a melodrama. 
Reading repetitive sections of the work, I was reminded of the plot of a 
Victorian melodrama: The murder of Maria Marten. The villain deals with 
the heroine by a) strangling her; b) stabbing her several times; c) emptying 
a loaded pistol into her; d) beating her to a pulp with a shovel. It was 
the shovel which proved his undoing. Sartre warns his readers early that 
he intends to use the shovel (and other weapons too) when he writes that in 
order to prove a certain point, he will be using twenty more examples later. 
That a 'crime' has been or is about to be committed is clear. The question 
is 'against whom?' Against Flaubert, as already suggested; more seriously, 
perhaps, against the reader, who is necessary to Sartre as a participant in 
the dialectical process. 
L'Idiot de la famille contains large sections based on the early 
writings of Flaubert. These are used both as a basis for the forming of 
Flaubert as a literary character, and also as the subject of Sartre's 
literary criticism. Most of the literary criticism is at the level of 
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psychocriticism, and here Sartre follows the patterns set by Marie 
Bonaparte, the Freudian psychoanalyst in her analysis of the life and 
work of Edgar Allan Poe. Sartre believed that Flaubert's early writings 
and his correspondence enabled him to gain a clear insight into the workings 
of the mind of the adult Flaubert, for here were expressed the problems on 
which were founded Flaubert's 'neurosis'. The treatment of the juvenilia 
is skilful, at times brilliant, and almost always convincing, within its 
accepted framework. For Sartre avoids the pitfall, found for example in the 
work of Mauron, of attempting to link each symbol directly with every other 
symbol. Instead, he tends to draw structural-type analogies. However, in 
spite of his obvious facility in ferreting out attitudes and modes of 
expression in Flaubert's writings and relating them to events in real life, 
there are aspects which give the reader cause for thought. Some aspects seem 
exaggerated, and so make the reader question other assumptions. In order to 
'prove' his statement that Flaubert was slow in learning to speak for himself, 
and that part of his problems in confronting reality later in life stemmed 
from the fact that as a child Flaubert saw that adults (or others) were, in 
a way, in charge of language, Sartre gives as evidence that adults continually 
put words into his mouth, by telling him to 'say good morning to the lady' or 
by asking 'where does it hurt? Here? Here?'^^ To suggest that this sort of 
event gives rise to neurosis is absurd. Most people, at least in the western 
world, would have experienced this type of prompting during childhood, yet 
it would be madness to assume that this has given rise to a whole generation 
living at a remove from reality. 
13 L'Idiot, p. 23. 
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There are other instances where Sartre has attempted to use passages 
from Flaubert's published works to make a point. From a passage in 
Madame Bovar.y, where L^on expresses an interest in Emma's glove, Sartre 
insinuates that for Flaubert the gloved hand was a fetish, a phallic symbol. 
This should probably be treated as whimsy. It is possible that Sartre would 
have taken up this sort of episode in the unwritten volume four of L'Idiot 
de la fami lie, which was intended to be a 're-reading' or a critical analysis 
on structural lines of Madame Bovary. However, within the scope of this 
study it would be nonsensical to speculate on what Sartre had intended to 
include and what approach he would have taken. 
Literary settings and characterisations can be determined by the 
vocabulary the writer uses. Joseph Halpern^'' noted Sartre's choice of 
sensual vocabulary in L'Idiot de la familie. He remarked on this as a 
feature of Sartre's writing, showing that from L'Imaginaire, where Sartre 
wrote of the 'artist-prophet, philosopher-hero as masculine figure, form-
giver, hard and erect; thing among things, man among men', he tended to 
emphasise the superiority of the male over the female, the masculine element 
over the feminine element. The opposition of masculine and feminine elements 
has already been explained as the opposition of active and passive elements, 
or of head and heart. Baudelaire^ ^  offers a crude example of Sartre's use 
of sensual vocabulary to assert a masculine superiority over the feminine. 
In this work, masculine and feminine types of imagination are discussed. 
The masculine is classified as 'explosive' and the feminine as 'retractile'. 
14 Joseph Halpern, Critical fictions; the literary criticism of J-P. Sartre, 
New Haven, Yale U.P. , 1976. 
15 J-P. Sartre, Baudelaire, Paris, Gallimard, 1947. 
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Sartre also used these symbols in Orphge Noir^^ where the constructive, 
revolutionary potency of black poetry is transposed into his metaphorical 
scheme of sexuality. In comparison with effeminate European 1itterateurs, 
the black is the male of the earth, the sperm of nature. George Bauer^'^ 
suggests an origin for these types of imagination, and places the whole 
in the perspective of Sartre's search for the self: 
"The Orphic descent into the self results in the creation of 
the poem-object that fulfils Sartre's aesthetic requirement 
of the representation of man's becoming . . . Sartre gingerly 
relates these adjectives of flickering and turbulence to that 
of Nietzsche's 'Dionysian'. The Nietzschean antithesis 
between the 'Dionysian' and the 'Apollonian' is well-suited 
to Sartre's 'esth^tique d'opposition' and his categories of 
being and existence. Nietzsche himself defines the 'Apollonian' 
as: 'that state of rapt repose in the presence of a visionary 
world, in the presence of the world of 'beautiful appearance', 
designed as a deliverance from 'becoming'; the word 'Dionysos' 
on the other hand, stands for strenuous becoming, grown self-
conscious of the violent anger of the destroyer.'" 
The reader is aware, in L'Idiot de la famille, of the Dionysian character 
of Sartre's writing, and of Sartre as both the creator and destroyer of 
his literary figures, particularly Flaubert. 
The fact that Flaubert has been depicted as representing the feminine 
element, through various studies both of his life and his writings carried out 
in L'Idiot de la famille, seems characteristic of Sartre's approach to 
his biographical heroes. In the preface to L'Idiot de la famille, Sartre 
states that he had conceived the project with the idea of having a score to 
16 J.-P.Sartre, 'Orph^e noir', in Situations III, Paris, Gallimard, 1949. 
17 George Bauer, Sartre and the artist, Chicago, Chicago U.P., 1969, p. 167. 
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settle with Flaubert. However, over the years, his attitude had 
mellowed, to the point where his antipathy had become empathy, and he 
could finally approach Flaubert without any prejudices. This may be 
refuted by a detailed study of Sartre's vocabulary. Within the scope 
of this study, there is no room for such a detailed investigation, and 
I am aware of the dangers inherent in presenting two or three superficial 
examples. However, the following may serve as indications of Sartre's 
intentions. His discussion of Flaubert's "negative verticality", and its 
sexual implications has already been mentioned: Flaubert refused to accept 
his responsibility as male. To emphasise this, although the attitude is 
never made explicit, Sartre takes what at first appears to be a mechanical 
approach to Flaubert in his situation, which would accord with his views 
on the novel of aviation. On reflection, this can also be taken as an 
extension of the view of Flaubert as 'female'. The examples taken refer 
to the sphere of language and communication. Sartre describes language in 
relation to Flaubert as a 'mauvais conducteur', using what psychocritics may 
see as the male symbol of the lightning conductor. On two occasions, at 
least, Sartre comments on Flaubert's place within society; in both cases 
he uses the metaphor of the screw: he describes the child Flaubert firstly 
as being 'mal viss^ dans I'univers du discours'^® and later writes that 'la 
cellule sociale est trop integree; un tour de vis de trop, somme toute'^^ 
Underlying the exploration of Flaubert's character, the reader senses 
Sartre's 'masculinity' opposing Flaubert's 'femininity'. As Sartre himself 
wrote in Question de methode: 
18 L ^ i A l ^ . P- 23. 
19 Ibid, p. 53. 
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"Nous ne devrons jamais oublier que le style d'un auteur est 
directement lie a une conception du monde: la structure des 
phrases, des paragraphes, I'usage et la place du substantif, du 
verbe, etc., la constitution des paragraphes et les caracteristiques 
du r^cit - pour ne citer que ces quelques particularites - traduisent 
des presuppositions secretes qu'on peut determiner diff^rentiellement 
sans recourir encore h la biographie. 
Sartre's own style is so reflective of his conception of the world, 
that L'Idiot de la fami lie can be neither novelistic nor factual. Halpern 
claims that he has satisfactorily created the necessary tension between the 
'roman vrai' and the 'vie romancee' to make both aspects of the work 
successful. However, this is not the case. To place the relationship 
between imagination and documentation in perspective, it will be necessary 
to 'resort to biography', and to examine the question 'What can one know 
of a man today?' 
20 Question de m^thode, p. 90. 
A MAN IMAGINED? L'IDIOT DE LA FAMILLE AS 
A BIOGRAPHY OF FLAUBERT 
. L'Idiot de 1a famille, in its sub-title "Gustave Flaubert de 
1821 a 1857", proclaims the work a biography, and the first page of 
the Preface states that Sartre's concern was to discover what one could 
know of a man today. In an interview with Le Monde^ Sartre said that the 
underlying plan in his 'Flaubert' was to show that, eventually, everything 
could be communicated, and that without being God, being a man like any 
other, one could arrive at a perfect understanding of another man, as 
long as one had all the information necessary. 
The biography of Flaubert was not the first work of this nature 
which Sartre had undertaken. Earlier books and essays dealt with the 
lives of Baudelaire, Tintoretto, Mallarme, Genet and Sartre himself. 
Wilfred Desan commented that in these works, Sartre showed the artist 
struggling alone with his overwhelming world and taking flight in 
imagination, and in L'Idiot de la famille, he had himself taken a 
theoretical retreat into imagination^. Jameson also noted that a 
significant part of Sartre's life's work had been given over to a 
portrait and analysis of the French middle class. He contended that 
'this is perhaps his most important contribution to the history of ideas 
behind literature, as opposed to the purely literary examination of forms'^ 
A study of other biographers and writers on biography will help to 
put Sartre's attitude to biography in a broader perspective. Although Sartre 
1 Interview given to Le Monde Weekly, June 17-23, 1971. 
2 Wilfred Desan, 'Sartre the individualist', in Patterns of the life-
world: essays in honor of John Wild, Evanston, Northwestern U.P., 
1970, p. 229. 
3 Jameson, Three methods, p. 218. 
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does not acknowledge the influence of Andre Maurois, it is inconceivable 
that he should not have read some of Maurois's 'vies romanc^es' or at 
least been aware of the scope and form of "the biographies. Andr^ Maurois 
asked if we could know the truth of a man". In reply to his own question, 
he wrote that we could 'try to fix those changing lights and shades', to 
'produce the sound of the individual and authentic note', but that the 
biographer's truth was not empirical. Alan Shelston^ saw the attraction 
of biography as two-fold, appealing to our curiosity about human personality 
and to our interest in factual knowledge. Maurois believed that 'the 
search for historical truth is the work of the scholar', whilst 'the 
search for the expression of a personality is rather the work of the 
artist'^. Virginia Woolf quoted Sir Sidney Lee to sum up the same point: 
'The aim of biography', said Sir Sidney Lee, who had perhaps 
read and written more lives than any man of his time, 'is 
the truthful transmission of a personality', and no single 
sentence could more neatly split up into two parts the whole 
problem of biography as it presents itself to us today. On 
the one hand there is truth; on the other there is 
personal ity.''' 
Sartre, in his biographical method, considered the essence of the 
individual as a dialectic between the truth of history or reality and the 
truth of personality or imagination. Thus he attempted to balance a 
Marxist appraisal of the society in which Flaubert lived, with a psycho-
analytic investigation of Flaubert and his relationship with this society. 
4 Andr^ Maurois, Aspects of biography. New York, Ungar, 1966, p. 103. 
5 Alan Shelston, Biography, London, Methuen, 1977, p. 3. 
6 Maurois, p. 36. 
7 Ibid, p. 36. 
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Sartre would have agreed with Shelston, that although not all twentieth 
century biography is explicitly Freudian, it lives in Freud's shadow. 
He was familiar with the earliest work of "literary psychoanalysis in 
French, the work of Marie Bonaparte on Edgar Allan Poe in the 1930's, 
and was himself an indirect influence on Charles Mauron, in that writer's 
formulation of psychocriticism. Like other post-Romantic biographers, 
Sartre dwelt on the formative years of childhood, and influenced by Bruno 
Bettelheim's writings, went further than many biographers in laying stress 
on the importance of the earliest months of life in determining future 
personality. Simone de Beauvoir drew attention to Sartre's reading of 
Bettelheim's The Empty Fortress^ and the influence of this work is clear 
from the start of L' Idiot de la famille. Sartre explains the emphasis he 
places on early childhood, when he writes: 
'Sans la petite enfance, c'est peu de dire que le biographe 
bStit sur le sable: il construit sur la brume avec du 
brouillard'^. 
Sartre dwells on the attitudes of Flaubert's parents, particularly his 
mother, towards him in the first months of his life. He discusses her 
disappointment at his being a male child, instead of a wished-for daughter, 
and in part bases what he sees as Flaubert's femininity in this. Sartre 
also covers the possible results of her doubts over her child's survival, 
and the mechanical rather than motherly care which he contends Flaubert 
received from his mother. All of these, together with other events, 
contributed, he alleges, to creating Flaubert a passive person. 
8 Quoted from memory. 
9 L'Idiot, p. 55. 
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Whilst Maurois did not comment in Aspects of biography on the use 
of Freudian techniques in determining a subject's personality, he does 
mention the use of history, a facet of biography of some concern to 
Sartre. For Maurois, history should be to the biographer what it is to 
the portrait painter, the background against which he sets his model. 
This is very much the way in which Sartre dealt with the historical 
background in some parts of his study of Flaubert, for example, in his 
coverage of Flaubert's school days^°, where Gustave remains in sharp 
focus. However, especially in volume III, Sartre uses a different perspective, 
Using broad strokes, he paints a picture of the time in which Flaubert lived, 
bringing out political and cultural trends. Here his approach is in direct 
conflict with Edmund Gosse, who held that: 
'Broad views are entirely out of place in biography; and there 
is no greater literary mistake than to attempt what is called 
The Life and Times of a man. History deals with the fragments 
of the vast roll of events. It must always begin abruptly and 
close in the middle of affairs; it must altogether deal, 
impartially, with a vast number of persons. Biography ( . . . ) 
fills the canvas with one figure, and the other characters, 
however great in themselves, must always be subsidiary to the 
central hero'^^. 
Maurois claimed that 'according to the historical determination of a 
Karl Marx, for instance, the mere intention to write a biography is a crime 
against t r u t h ' H o w e v e r , Sartre's broader interpretation of the Marxian 
view of the historical process allowed him to use Marx's own writings - he 
used The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte as an example - to support 
his own view that the synthesis of an individual's intention and the result 
of his action was an important factor in the making of history. 
10 Ibid, p. 1330. 
11 Maurois, p. 61. 
12 Ibid, p. 105. 
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Sartre was keen to present the truth of a man, and was aware that 
since each individual has many facets, in order to do so, he needed to 
employ a number of methods to capture the essence. He discussed the 
need to use novelistic techniques in an attempt to produce 'un roman 
vrai'. As mentioned in a previous chapter, he likens the novel to a 
detective's notebook. J. L. Clifford, in From puzzles to portraits, 
also likens the biographer to a detective, and says that 'as every 
detective knows, clues keep turning up which are quite unconnected with 
the main problem, but which eventually lead to others equally important'^^. 
Virginia Woolf in The new biography, emphasises the biographer's need to 
use the techniques of the novelist: 
"in order that the light of personality may shine through, 
facts must be manipulated, others shaded, yet in the process 
they must never lose their integrity. The biographer 
chooses; he synthesises; in short he has ceased to be 
the chronicler; he has become the artist"^'*. 
Sartre stated a number of times that it was Flaubert's literary 
output which interested him, and which originally led him to believe he 
had a score to settle with the earlier author. Although he remained 
antagonistic to certain of Flaubert's attitudes, which he characterised 
as bourgeois, it is clear that he ended by appreciating the influence of 
certain factors in Flaubert's development, as he indicated in the Preface 
to L'Idiot de la fami lie. 
Before considering some of the methods used in L'Idiot de la famille, 
it is useful to compare Sartre's biography with a more conventional one, 
13 J. L. Clifford, From puzzles to portraits. Chapel Hill, University of 
north Caroline Press, 1970, p. 41. 
14 Quoted by Shelston, Biography, pp. 65-66. 
- 8 2 -
such as Enid Starkie's Flaubert; the making of the master and Flaubert the 
master. The aim of Starkie's biography, published in two volumes, was 
much the same as that of Sartre. She aimed first to tell the life of 
Flaubert up to the publication of Madame Bovary, including analyses of the 
early works; and, second, to look at the work of the mature Flaubert and 
to attempt some sort of critical analysis of Flaubert's literary output. 
Yet in spite of their common aim, the subject of the studies, Gustave 
Flaubert, appears as two quite different people. The reason for this 
discrepancy is to be found in the methodological approaches used by 
Starkie and Sartre. Starkie's implied methodological premise was to 
stick as closely to the facts as possible, to suggest hypotheses rarely, 
and then only when she had made clear that the statement was hypothetical. 
She aimed to describe Flaubert rather than to explain him. Sartre, on the 
other hand, did not regard the facts as ends in themselves, but rather as 
starting points and landmarks for his project of 'understanding'. Because 
one level of explanation or understanding entails others, Sartre's method 
led him further and further from the facts as he built the character of 
his Flaubert^^. 
That Sartre uses three levels of 'fact' in his investigation has 
already been mentioned. He also uses several different methods to develop 
and explain the 'character of his Flaubert', which he builds around three 
main facets - the tragic figure of the accursed poet telling his griefs; 
the bored old man who has died to life and now rails against the world, and 
the passive artist who records a world which he eschews and does not 
comprehend^ 
15 Ronald Aronson, L'Idiot, p. 93. 
16 Culler, p. 34. 
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The first of these methods derives from the notion put forward in 
L'&tre et le n^ant. Here, Sartre had discussed the extent of control an 
individual had over his own destiny, and concluded that any man was totally 
responsible for his place in the world. However, partly through his contact 
with Marxism, Sartre came to believe that a man's place may, in part, be 
determined by factors over which he has no control. Thus, in the case of 
Flaubert, at the moment of his conception, certain factors were unalterable -
the baby would be born the younger child of a bourgeois family, his father 
a doctor, his mother a member of a land-owning family; his parents would 
have attitudes towards their child and towards the world which would be 
inescapable, at least in the early years. In L'Idiot de la famille, Sartre 
maintains that Flaubert remained, throughout his life, the younger son of 
a bourgeois family, always accepting to be conditioned by his surroundings, 
his 'prehistory', never taking a stand against the society in which he 
lived and thus never taking responsibility for his destiny. This was one 
of the factors which made Flaubert, in the eyes of Sartre, a passive person, 
a failure. 
To reach the same conclusion, and using much of the same material, 
Sartre employs a type of psychoanalysis. The infant Flaubert's relationship 
with his mother has already been described and is epitomised in the symbolic 
emasculation of Flaubert: 
"II est permis ici d'utiliser le vocabulaire de la psychanalyse 
et d'appeler castration la constitution par les soins maternels 
d'une activite passive qui empechera pour toujours le cadet 
Flaubert de montrer - en quelque domaine que ce soit - une 
aggressivite 'virile'"^^. 
17 L'Idiot, p. 875. 
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The presentation of the relationship of Achille-Clgophas, the father, to 
his sons Achille and Gustave, similarly, indicates that parental attitudes 
helped to make Gustave a tentative person.. In this case, Sartre suggests^® 
that since the father accepted his elder son, his namesake, as his equal, 
'le Millie', he had to consider his younger son, Gustave, as different, an 
outsider, '1'Autre universel et singulier', 
Sartre analyses Flaubert's writings, particularly the juvenilia, in 
the same way that he examines the family relationships. He and Starkie are 
agreed that Madame Bovary represented the limit of Flaubert's literary 
development, and that later works showed only themes already explored. 
Much of the analysis of the early works is brilliant literary criticism 
(see above), and Sartre does not fall into the trap of applying a crude 
psycho-criticism, of the sort which Mauron applies to the works of Racine. 
However, he does use the content and form of the works as a basis for 
psychoanalytic study, for example, Quidquid volueris, where Sartre links 
the motivations of the half-human half-ape Djalioh, with the forces 
motivating the young Flaubert - seeing him as an instrument in the game 
of others, a creature not able to express his real feelings because he 
does not have the power of speech. Sartre also draws statements from 
Flaubert's fictional writings, where they are applied to a character, and 
transfer them directly to Flaubert. A blatant example of this is^^ in 
relation to Flaubert's short story Bibliomanie, written in November 1836, 
when Flaubert was fourteen years old. Sartre quotes the sentence: 'He 
hardly knew how to read', and exclaims 'So, here is the first precise 
allusion to the difficulties which Flaubert had, when he was about seven, 
in learning to read and write'. Unfortunately, this type of statement tends 
18 Ibid, p. 499. 
19 Ibid, p. 285. 
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to detract from the finesse of some of the literary criticism, and at the 
same time, adds nothing to the biographical study. 
Sartre uses the principles of literary criticism which he set out in 
Qu'est-ce que la 1ittgrature?, although he has modified his position 
slightly. It will be remembered that, in the earlier work, he accepted 
only the commitment of the prose writer, and denied the validity of any 
use of language in a poetic manner. In L'Idiot de la famille, he accepts 
that the poet, too, may be committed to his project, and draws a line 
between the poet and the artist. The artist is the poet who expresses 
what is not actual, who 'irrealises' , he is accursed and will spend his 
days telling of his problems and hardships without achieving any change in 
his situation. Thus, using yet another method, Sartre reduces Flaubert 
to the ranks of the passive or impotent. Here, he has on the one hand 
accepted Flaubert's project to be a writer, and on the other hand, he has 
nullified the validity of this project, by placing him among the 'accursed 
poets' who never achieve anything. 
These methods, Sartre claims, have attempted to 
"comprendre [Flaubert], c'est-a-dire etudier ses conduites 
a partir de ses fins et les envisager comme reponses a des 
situations vecues plQtot que de les declarer aberrantes en 
les comparant aux stimuli 'rdels' ou aux conduites des autres 
11 2 0 
Superficially, Sartre would seem to have achieved this end, for he has kept 
Flaubert as the focus of his study almost throughout the first two volumes 
of L'Idiot de la famille. He has not actually compared Flaubert with his 
20 Ibid, V. 3, p. 12. 
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contemporaries, or considered him acting in the real world. Yet his attempts 
to understand Flaubert must be far from objective; for Sartre has made an 
initial judgement of Flaubert, by comparing him with his own view of a man, 
and found him wanting. 
In volume III of L'Idiot de la famille, Sartre attempts to 'situate' 
Flaubert. Here he sets out to examine the neurosis of the age and to place 
Flaubert's neurosis in a wider context. To do this, he discusses the place 
of literature within a society, and restates ideas on reading first set 
down in Qu'est-ce que la littgrature? He discusses, at length, Flaubert's 
relationship to the Second Empire, bringing together many ideas expressed 
earlier in L'Idiot de la famille, such as Flaubert's view of nobility, 
and his comprehension of the Emperor as le Garqon. He attempts to show 
that Flaubert was not the only young man of his generation to suffer a 
bourgeois upbringing by comparing him with Leconte de Lisle. As has been 
shown, the choice of this particular writer for comparison allowed Sartre 
to reiterate his own views on 'negritude', and to discuss the difference 
between one type of oppressed group, the working class, and another, the 
colonised. He had intended volume III to be a Marxist investigation of the 
nineteenth century. However, he does not examine the development of France, 
politically or economically; the overall effect is that of conjecture as 
shakily based as most of the rest of the study, disappointing to any reader 
who expected to find a rigorous investigation. Furthermore, he does little 
to 'situate' Flaubert, for the study in volume III relates as little to 
empirical data as do the biographical details of the first two volumes. 
The brief illustration of Sartre's biographical methods has tended to 
show that the reader will glean little understanding of the actions of 
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Gustave Flaubert, and that without prior knowledge of his life-story, 
Sartre's work is in large part unintelligible. However, at the point 
of deepest frustration, the reader must bear in mind Sartre's own statement, 
frequently repeated throughout L'Idiot de la fami11e, that the life of 
Flaubert, the personality being constructed for the reader, relied to a 
great extent on the imagination of Flaubert's biographer. Many biographers, 
including Maurois, have dealt with the need for the biographer to use his 
imagination and art to change a series of events from actual life into 
something which has an inner life, and thus rings true^^. 
Bowen^^ has pointed out that the biographer cannot get inside the 
mind of his subject. Sartre, when he says that he has reached a state 
of empathy with Flaubert, means just the opposite, and throughout L'Idiot 
de la fami lie, places himself firmly within his view of Flaubert's mind. 
This leads to the most serious criticism which can be levelled against 
L'Idiot de la famille as a biography of Flaubert - that the distinction 
between biographer and biographee is obscured. Through the shifting use 
of narrative and monologue and because of the extent of many of the sections, 
Sartre is able to put forward Flaubert's own views, Flaubert's views as 
imagined by Sartre, and Sartre's own views as though each were interchangeable 
with the other and the overall impression no different. 
It is worthwhile taking up Maurois's point that the biographer needs 
to make the life of his subject 'ring true', and to 'novelise' it to a 
certain extent. Sartre had, after all, dubbed L'Idiot de la famille a 
21 Maurois, pp. 180-200. 
22 Catherine Bowen, Biography, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1968, p. 96. 
- 8 8 -
"true novel", as well as acknowledging it as an 'imaginary study'. 
Aronson remarked^^ that this work of Sartre's, the 'imaginary study', 
the 'true novel', contained the worst of both possible worlds: 
"On the one hand, all the staggering interiority of an 
extended subjective case study; on the other hand, all 
the unreality of an extended construct. A novel may be 
unreal, but at least it is concrete: it deals with 
living, breathing people and their action." 
In Marxism and form, Jameson examined^'' the 'biographical impulse' 
in Sartre's novels and plays. He saw this as the desire to represent 
the recreation of an individual's most morbid states from the inside -
in other words, to present a psychoanalytic structure. He also saw it 
as central to the problems around which Question de methode was organised. 
The importance of this work to the methodology employed in L'Idiot de la 
familie has been discussed earlier; however, it is relevant to emphasise 
its place in forming a basis for existential psychoanalysis, and thus for 
existential biography. Jameson quotes^^ a passage from Question de methode 
which he believes may stand as the essential theory of Sartre's biographical 
practice: 
"Of course someone will tell us that the proclaimed goal of 
the followers of Brissot is a mask, that these bourgeois 
revolutionaries considered themselves and presented them-
selves as illustrious Romans, that it is the objective 
result that really defines what they did. But we must be 
careful: the original thought of Marx, as we find it in 
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte attempts a 
difficult synthesis of intention and of result; the 
contemporary use of that thought is superficial and 
dishonest. If we push the Marxist metaphor to its limit, 
in fact, we arrive at a new idea of human action. Imagine 
23 Aronson, L'Idiot, p. 106. 
24 Frederic Jameson, Marxism and form, Princeton, N.J., Princeton U.P., 
1971, pp. 211-214. 
25 Ibid, pp. 227-228. 
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an actor who is playing Hamlet and who is caught up in his 
role. He crosses his mother's room to kill Polonius hidden 
behind the arras. But that is not what he is actually doing. 
He is crossing a stage before an audience and passing from 
'court side' to 'garden side' in order to earn his living, 
to win fame, and this real activity defines his position 
in society. But one cannot deny that these real results 
are present in some way in his imaginary act. One cannot deny 
that the movement of the imaginary prince expresses in a 
certain indirect and refracted manner the actor's real 
movement, nor that the very way in which he takes himself 
for Hamlet is his own way of knowing himself as an actor. 
To return to our Romans of 1789, their way of cal1ing 
themselves Cato is their way of making themselves bourgeois, 
members of a class which discovers History and which already 
wants to stop it, which claims to be universal and which 
establishes the proud individualism of its members upon a 
competitive economy - in short, the heirs of a classical 
culture. Everything is there. It is one and the same thing 
to declare oneself Roman and to want to stop the Revolution. 
Or rather, the better one can pose as Brutus or Cato, the 
better one will be able to stop the Revolution. This thought, 
obscure even to itself, sets up mystical ends which enclose 
the confused awareness of its objective ends. Thus we may 
speak simultaneously of a subjective drama (the simple play 
of appearances which hides nothing, which contains no 
'unconscious' element) and of an objective, intentional 
organisation of real means with a view to achieving real ends -
without any organisation of all this by a consciousness or a 
premeditated will. Very simply, the truth of the imaginary 
praxis is in the real praxis, and the real to the extent that 
it takes itself as merely imaginary, includes implicit 
references to the imaginary praxis as to its interpretation. 
The bourgeois of 1789 does not pretend to be Cato in order 
to stop the Revolution by denying History and by substituting 
virtue for politics; neither does he tell himself that he 
resembles Brutus in order to give himself a mythical 
comprehension of an action which he carries out but which 
escapes him. He does both at the same time. And it is 
precisely this synthesis which allows us to discover an 
imaginary action in each one as a doublet and at the same 
time the matrix of real objective action." 
(Question de mgthode, pp. 38-39) 
Through this passage, Sartre draws a parallel between the consequence of 
real and imaginary actions, and in the final sentence of the passage quoted 
gives precedence to the imaginary. In the same way, in his study of 
Flaubert, he uses both Freudian and Marxist methods to analyse the 
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individual, and allows imaginary praxis and imaginary psychoanalysis to 
take precedence over real praxis and a serious attempt at psychoanalysis. 
Thus the reader of L'Idiot de la famille as a biography of Flaubert 
is justified in finding it unsatisfactory, and may be led to question who 
is the real subject of the study. 
A MAN PERCEIVED? L'IDIOT DE LA FAMILLE AS 
A BIOGRAPHY OF SARTRE 
Who is the man Sartre has put at the centre of L' Idiot de la fami'He? 
As an objective study of Gustave Flaubert," the work is lengthy and 
uninformative; as a subjective investigation of the inner workings 
of the man's mind, it is interesting, almost exciting at times, but 
overall, it is convoluted and tedious. In other words, in no way may 
L'Idiot de la fami lie be considered an adequate biography of Flaubert. 
The man who is the subject of the fundamental question 'What can we know 
of a man today?' is Sartre himself. 
To substantiate this statement, it is necessary to look at the 
factors which give a reader grounds for making it. However, even the 
closest examination of the facts will not reveal this as a work on 
Sartre. In spite of this, I feel that L'Idiot de 1a famille does have 
Jean-Paul Sartre as its subject, and will attempt to demonstrate this 
by applying Sartre's own theory of the imagination, as set out in 
L'Imaginaire. Sartre ascribed four features to the image, the base 
material of imagination; firstly, the image is a kind of consciousness, 
a way of thinking of something; secondly, it may be described as quasi-
observation, although in this case the image is always impoverished; a 
third feature of the image is that when we think with images, we know what 
we are doing; fourthly, the image is spontaneous, and in imagination we 
are presenting things to ourselves. The authenticity of the image of 
imagination resides in the fact that through imagination we can recreate 
the feelings associated with the real thing. It is its spontaneity which 
lends it vitality. 
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In L'Imaqinaire^, Sartre discusses at length the case of our 
recognising an imitation as a representation of a particular person. 
He takes the example of the actress Francohay doing an impersonation of 
Maurice Chevalier. The imitation must be an approximation, because 
Franconay is a small plump dark-haired woman. However the pointers to 
Chevalier are clear - the straw hat set at an angle, the cane, the gait. 
The object which Franconay produces is a feeble form which can always be 
interpreted in two distinct ways: I am always free to see Maurice 
Chevalier as an image, or to see a small stout woman who is making 
faces. Sartre makes the point that it is our conceptual recognition 
which is dealing with Maurice Chevalier, so that from now on, it is a 
question of 'realising my knowledge in the material provided for me'. 
Thus it is always possible in these circumstances for our consciousness 
to slip from the level of imagination to that of perception. In Sartre's 
words, 'a hybrid condition follows, which is neither perception nor 
imagination. It is both.' In the stage setting outlined above, we are 
seeing Chevalier j_n Franconay, that is, we are seeing him in our imagination. 
Mary Warnock comments that 'the performance is in Ryle's phrase, a 
"stimulus to the imagination'"^. 
Several critics have regarded Sartre's literary output as an attempt 
at communication. King notedHhat 'basically Sartre would see the life of 
Flaubert as an effort to communicate with the absolute through the illusion 
1 All references to L'Imaginaire wi11 refer to the English translation; 
the French edition was unavailable. 
J-P. Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination, New York, Citadel, 1966, pp. 34 
sqq. 
2 Mary Warnock, Imagination, London, Faber, 1976, p. 70. 
3 Thomas King, Sartre and the sacred, Chicago, Chicago U.P., 1974, p. 144. 
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of the image. But the communication is not in the brief moment that one is 
able to believe in the image, it is in the moment of despair when the 
image collapses.' Although King was discussing communication with a 
God-figure, and there may be no despair at the level under consideration 
here, the fact remains that communication may be strongest when the image 
presented is weak. 
In L'Imaginaire, Sartre discusses memory, presenting the reader with 
a confused picture, which both sets memory apart from imagination, and 
links them together. Phyllis Morris'* showed that for Sartre, memory was 
a secondary criterion of identity, and that we can remember a past event 
either as continuous with or discontinuous with the present system. 
Both communication and memory were important to Wittgenstein. In 
Phi 1 osophical investigations, he uses the trick-picture of the duck/ 
rabbit. To some, the image of the duck will be communicated; to others, 
it is the image of a rabbit; to a few, who have seen it before, it is a 
trick-picture, and they will see the image as a duck and/or as a rabbit. 
Wittgenstein considers the difference between 'seeing' and 'seeing as' at 
some length; that is not the concern of this study. The interesting point 
is what changes in one's perception when one sees the trick-picture first 
as one thing and then as the other. Wittgenstein says that the alteration 
is described like a perception, 'exactly as if the object had altered before 
my eyes.' The expression of this change of aspect is the expression of a new 
perception and at the same time of a perception being unchanged. On occasion, 
Wittgenstein, too, extends the use of imagination to include recognition. 
4 Phyllis Morris, Sartre's concept of a person, Amherst, University of 
Massachusetts, 1976, p. 105. 
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L'Idiot de 1a famille is Sartre's trick-picture, his version of 
Franconay impersonating Chevalier. Throughout the three volumes there 
are numerous touches reminiscent of Sartre rather than Flaubert, which 
bring to mind the concerns of the twentieth century rather than the nineteenth. 
Parallels exist between Sartre's upbringing and Flaubert's. In 
L'Idiot de la famille, Sartre discusses at length the social position of 
Achille-Cl^ophas, the country boy, son of a veterinary surgeon, who 
became a city doctor and who instilled in his own son the values of his 
country upbringing, values which would probably have been outdated by at 
least a generation. From this picture, Sartre creates Gustave a man who 
dreams of a pre-Revolution society, such as grandfather Flaubert would 
have known. In his story of his own life, Sartre wrote: 
"Entre la premi&re revolution russe et le premier conflit 
mondial, au moment que Daniel de Fontanin d^couvrait Les 
Nourritures terrestres, un homme due XIX sifecle imposait 
h son petit-fils les id^es en cours sous Louis-Philippe ( . . . ) 
Je prenais le depart avec un handicap de quatre-vingts ans. 
Faut-il m'en plaindre? Je ne sais pas: dans nos societes 
en mouvement les retards donnent quelquefois de I'avance"^. 
Thus Sartre himself was raised with ideas more fitting to his grandfather's 
generation. Still on a personal level, as has already been mentioned, 
Sartre makes the case that Gustave's mother would rather have had a 
daughter, so that she could relive her own childhood, but happily. In 
Les Mots, Sartre says that in his earliest childhood, he was treated rather 
like a girl, and he had long curls which his mother would not cut, in 
spite of the insistence of her parents: 
5 Les mots, p. 56. 
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"Anne-Marie tenait bon; elle eOt aime, je pense, que je 
fusse une fille pour de vrai; avec quel bonheur elle etit combl^ 
de bienfaits sa triste enfance ressuscit^e. Le d e l ne I'ayant 
pas exauc^e, elle s'arrangea: j'aurais le sexe des anges, 
indetermine mais f6minin sur les bords"^. 
It is generally acknowledged that there was a very close bond between 
Flaubert and his younger sister, Caroline, even closer than that between 
son and mother. Sartre describes how his mother, Anne-Marie, was treated 
still as a child by her parents, so that he could regard her as his older 
sister, but still he wanted a younger one. "Aujourd'hui encore - 1963 -
c'est bien le seul lien de parents qui m'gmeuve"^. In dealing with 
the world outside the family, it is possible to recognise factors relating 
to the life of Sartre in his discussion of Flaubert. For Sartre, Gustave 
was a dunce at school; because, according to Sartre, he could not achieve 
the place of honour, Sartre had him as the butt of ridicule, an outsider. 
This does not fit the picture of Flaubert at school gained from other 
sources, where although by no means an excellent pupil in all subjects, 
he did produce good work for his literature and history teachers, and 
furthermore was popular with his classmates, acting at times as their 
spokesman and leader. Sartre's projection of this image of Flaubert makes 
more sense if one brings to mind Wittgenstein's trick picture. Memory 
will inform the reader of Les mots that it was Sartre whose performance 
at school, at least at the beginning, was atrocious, and who was an out-
sider in the games of the other children. Perhaps the most profound 
expression of the link which Sartre felt between himself and Flaubert is 
to be found in his discussion of the notion 'loser takes all', considered 
above. Perceived otherwise, this may be seen as the most profound thing 
Sartre wished to say about himself. Taking the following passage from 
6 Ibid, p. 89. 
7 Ibid, p. 48. 
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Les mots as a model, it would seem that this was entirely within the 
bounds of possibility: 
"Je ne relfeve que d'eux qui ne rel&vent que de Dieu et je ne 
crois pas en Dieu ( . . . ) Pour ma part, je ne m'y reconnais 
pas et je me demande parfois si je ne joue pas I qui perd gagne 
et ne m'applique h pi^tiner mes espoirs d'autrefois pour que 
tout me soit rendu au centuple"®. 
On the political front, the trick-picture works slightly differently. 
Sartre has Flaubert liken the invading Prussians to the Huns, and the 
figure of Napoleon III is compared with Nero\ Nero, the dictator, is an 
image which Sartre had used previously, in his political writings, notably 
those concerned with the Algerian war^°. It is not an expression of 
Gustave Flaubert's views. Although it is documented that Flaubert resented 
the Prussians, and their occupation of his native land, the present writer 
suggests that certain passages do not relate to the nineteenth century 
invasion of Paris at all. An example of this is^^: 
"Puisque les Parisiens admirent les Prussiens, [Flaubert] admire 
la commune qui a tent^ - croit-il - d'abolir Paris et tous les 
habitants et qui - du moins - etait aussi un mouvement 
patriotique contre la capitulation honteuse devant la Prusse." 
One may see in this a reference to Sartre's views on the capitulation of 
Paris in the 1940's, and his support for the Resistance movement, which 
spontaneously attracted people from all walks of life and bound them 
together with a common purpose. In the same section of L'Idiot de la famille, 
8 Ibid, p. 213. 
9 L'Idiot, V. 3, passim. 
10 Preface to Albert Memmi, The coloniser and the colonised, London, 
Condor, 1974. 
11 L'Idiot, V. 3, p. 590. 
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Sartre brings Flaubert forward into the twentieth century^^: 
"on croirait que Gustave a pressenti a pres de cent ans de 
distance, notre stupeur devant Eichmann ou vingt autres criminels 
Nazis ( . . . ) on s'attendait, devant 1'ignoble grandeur de ce 
genocide, ^ voir para'ftre sinon des princes du Mai, des gens qui 
fussent en tout cas ^ la hauteur de leur crime et que T o n puisse 
ha'ir: on decouvrait des fonctionnaires tatilions, des bureaucrates 
qui n'avaient, ^ defaut de honte, pas mgme I'orgueil noir de ce 
qu'ils avaient fait." 
Still on a political level, Sartre's discussion of the position of 
Leconte de Lisle vis-^-vis the negro and slavery reaches much the same 
conclusions as Sartre had earlier reached and expressed, for example, in 
the preface to Memmi's The coloniser and the colonised. 
Sartre discusses Flaubert's need for acclaim. Although he points 
up examples through L'Idiot de la famille, the most interesting in the 
context of the trick-picture is his consideration of Flaubert and public 
and private acclaim, particularly in relation to the Legion of Honour. 
He presents^^ as though Flaubert himself were speaking, the view that under 
the First Empire, the Legion was only a symbol of the social hierarchy, 
and although inferior to the 'noblesse d'epee' since it was not hereditary, 
it nonetheless represented recruitment from above. Sartre goes on to 
discuss reasons for receiving decorations. Flaubert, he says, had no 
chance of being decorated: 
12 Ibid, V. 3, p. 631. 
13 Ibid, V. 3, pp. 561 sqq. 
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"inutile, il ne nuisait pas; rien ^ rgcompenser, pas de 
raison pour se le gagner. [ . . ] Seul Napoleon III, en tant 
que fausse resurrection de Napoleon I, pouvait distinguer 
Flaubert et I'integrer dans une chevalerie illusoire; de 
lui seul, Flaubert pouvait accepter cette distinction fantdme 
et discretement satanique, qui le consacrait aux yeux de tous 
mais illusoirement sans 1'engager ^ rien ou mieux pour I'inviter 
a perseverer dans le refus de tout engagement - et d'abord de 
celui de respecter 1' Empereur"^''. 
After the fall of the Second Empire, Sartre says, Flaubert refused to 
wear his decoration, because he did not want to be associated with a 
regime whose views he did not support. Sartre also claims that official 
recognition came too late to Flaubert, and its bestowal speeded the process 
of fossilisation^^. In reading Sartre's interesting exposition referred 
to here, it is impossible not to think of his own views on public honour. 
In 1964, Sartre was offered and refused the Nobel Prize for Literature, 
after the publication of his autobiography, Les mots. His letter of 
explanation to the Swedish Academy contains many of the points made in 
relation to Flaubert. Prominent among them is the suggestion that if 
Sartre were to accept the honour, then he would be tacitly acknowledging 
the principles of the institution; he felt that he would be compromising 
both himself and the institution if this were seen to be the case. He 
was concerned that the prize had not been offered to him at a time when 
he was actively engaged in a struggle for freedom - his commitment to the 
Algerian campaign - when official recognition could have made a tremendous 
difference to the immediate outcome of the situation. He expressed 
reservations about his freedom to go on writing as he chose, after he had 
14 Ibid, V. 3, p. 573. 
15 Ibid, V. 3, pp. 660-661. 
- 1 0 0 -
been awarded such an honour. Finally, he was aware of the danger that 
in -accepting the Nobel Prize, he would have to acknowledge that he had 
reached the peak of his literary career, that he would become a part of 
history, and the process of fossilisation would begin^®. 
There are many other areas which could be investigated, including 
the sheer hard work which both men put into their writings, and the 
concern each has shown for his health, both mental and physical. 
These few examples may be sufficient to indicate a parallel between 
L'Idiot de la fami11e and the performance by Franconay which Sartre 
described in L' Imaginaire. We are able to see Sartre J_n Flaubert, and 
the work as a whole acts as a stimulus to the imagination. It is also 
an example in written form of Wittgenstein's trick-picture, and by reading 
the work it is possible to find oneself in that hybrid condition which 
Sartre mentioned, which is neither perception, nor imagination, but both. 
Yet there is another level to Sartre's portrayal of himself through 
L'Idiot de la familie. He has set himself up as Flaubert's antagonist. 
Even though in the Preface he states that he no longer has a score to 
settle, the reader is often aware of Sartre's desire to be superior to 
Flaubert. One aspect of this, already briefly dealt with, is Sartre's 
wi.sh to oppose his masculinity to Flaubert's femininity. Another, more 
important aspect, is to be found in man's acceptance of his own freedom 
16 Dymphna Cusack, 'J-P. Sartre and the Nobel Prize', in Meanjin, No. 101, 
V. xxiv. No. 2, 1965, pp. 241-247. 
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to choose his own destiny. Sartre notes: "II est des hommes que 
I'histoire a forges beaucoup plus que la prehistoire, ecrasant en eux sans 
piti^ r e n f a n t qu'ils ont ^t^"^^. He cons-iders himself a man forged by 
history, whilst Flaubert is a man influenced by 'pre-history' - his 
childhood and surroundings. 
It may be difficult to reconcile this creator of an imaginary world 
and of a theory of imagination with the activist. However, as Jameson 
pointed out^®, the starting point of the theory of the imaginary is a theory 
of the real, which he sums up as follows: consciousness is basically 
activity; our primary relationship to the world is not a contemplative 
or static one, not one of knowledge, but one of action and work; the 
'world' in the phenomenological sense is not motionless space spread out 
before us, but rather time, 'hodological' space, a network of paths and 
roads, a complex organisation of means and ends and projects, unveiled 
through the movement of my own adventures and desires. Sartre himself 
put forward the view that freedom of action and freedom to envisage the 
non-existent are the same. He argues that consciousness must be free if 
it is able to conceive what is not the case: at the end of L'Imaginaire, 
he writes: 'For consciousness to be able to imagine, it must be able to 
escape from the world by its very nature; it must be able by its own 
efforts to withdraw from the world. In a word it must be free.' 
The equation of Sartre's belief in the freedom to act with the body 
with his belief in the freedom to act through imagination would seem to have 
17 L'Idiot, p. 55. 
18 Jameson, Three methods, p. 204. 
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serious implications, particularly in regard to a study of his own life. 
He roundly condemned Flaubert for his flights into the unreal. In fact, 
as mentioned above, all of Sartre's biographical studies dealt with 
the artist struggling with the overwhelming world, and escaping through 
imagination to avoid being crushed. 
In the early 1950's, a new theme appeared in Sartre's work, the 
difference between an 'acte' and a 'geste'. This was a distinction 
between a considered, intended action, a real or committed action, and 
an action which, although it might have been considered and although its 
consequences might have been the same as those of an 'acte'_,was in fact 
a sham, a mere appearance of the real thing. Does this imply that Sartre 
the committed activist could be considered Sartre the sham? A simple 
answer to this broad question may be that it does not, for in Sartre's 
existentialism, the really free man was the one who could live with the 
consequences of his actions. However, Sartre has, in all his writings, 
warned that man is a sham. Indeed, thoughout Les mots, he constantly 
reminded his reader that he himself was a sham (e.g., p. 32, p. 114, p. 121), 
and he emphasised the realness of the imagined or sham state when he said: 
"Ce que je viens d'gcrire est faux. Vrai. Ni vrai ni faux 
comme tout ce qu'on ^crit sur les fous, sur les hommes. J'ai 
rapportd les faits avec autant d'exactitude que ma m^moire le 
permettait. Mais jusqu'^ quel point croyais - je ^ mon delire? 
C'est la question fondamentale et pourtant je n'en decide 
pas. J'ai vu par la suite qu'on pouvait tout connattre de 
nos affections hormis leur force, c'est-^-dire leur sinc^rite"^^. 
19 Les mots, p. 61. 
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L'Idiot de la famil1e allows the reader to take part in what is 
sometimes an exhilarating intellectual exercise, shifting from imagination 
to perception and back again, all the time" aware of the double content of 
the trick-picture. However, even though Sartre said that he chose for a 
future the past of a famous dead man^°, it is as yet still impossible to 
appraise L'Idiot de la famille as a biographical study of Sartre. For as 
Sartre himself stated on several occasions it is impossible to give a 
meaning to a man's life, to the sum of his actions, until the pattern 
has been completed by death. Therefore, although it would be possible 
now to regard Sartre's blindness and ill-health as a death in life, it is 
essential to wait until the pattern is finally completed before attempting 
a definitive explanation of his life, even through such a source as 
L'Idiot de la famille. 
20 Ibid, p. 168. 
CONCLUSION; 'UN HOMME N'EST JAMAIS QU'UNE IMPOSTURE' 
We are familiar with the notion of transformation, of one thing 
changing its appearance and becoming something quite different. A 
caterpillar becomes a butterfly, a tadpole a frog; a cliff becomes a 
sandy beach, water becomes ice. These transformations occur in nature, 
in the real world. Through the world of fairy tale, from our earliest 
childhood, we are also encouraged to accept transformation: the frog 
becomes a charming prince; the loathsome damsel a beautiful princess. 
To the innocent, transformation both in nature and in fairy tales appears 
to take place through a magical process. 
Transformation both as a process in the real world, and as a process 
of the imagination is in general terms accepted unquestioningly. The 
world of art makes much of this acceptance: literature itself is often 
seen as a transformation of the real world. Within the framework of the 
art of literature there are two concepts of transformation which are worthy 
of consideration in relation to Sartre's L'Idiot de la fami lie. The first 
is that of metamorphosis, the legendary process of change, which happens 
as if by magic, and is then imposed by forces external to the subject; 
the second is that of the actor, who wilfully changes his own appearance, 
and assumes the form of another person. In each case, the transformed 
state includes aspects of the former state. 
Metamorphosis, Kafka's novel, which details the stages in the 
uncontrollable change of a young man's body to that of a beetle, emphasises 
that the young man was an unwilling participant in the process, and that 
traces of both creatures - human and animal - were at all times present. 
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The influence of this work on Sartre's writings has already been 
mentioned^. Metamorphosis, the palpable transformation of one image into 
another, as if by magic, is a feature of his later writings. The theory 
of the imaginary set out in L'Imaginaire is exemplified by the trans-
formation of one presented image into another; imagination and perception 
are synthesised to create the metamorphic product - a state where both 
the imagined and the perceived come together. 
In some of Sartre's theoretical works, in particular Question de 
mgthode and the Critique as well as in the biographies, he placed an 
emphasis on death as a metamorphic state. Death contains the whole of 
life; all of an individual's actions are subsumed in this ultimate and 
lasting action. In Question de mgthode Sartre explained death as a prior 
condition, in Marxist terms, in the evolution of the historical process; 
it was the result of a series of actions on the one hand, and the point 
of departure for another series, being at the same time past, present and 
future. This is in direct parallel with the process undergone by the 
observer of Franconay doing her impersonation of Chevalier^. 
Death was the most significant event of any life for Sartre, because 
it provided the completion of a series of actions, leaving an unalterable 
situation. It also allowed one to enter the life at any point, to regard 
events in the light of their consequences. Sartre realised, as a child, the 
great potential in this for metamorphosis. The dead could offer no surprises, 
having done their living; the living could be both what the dead had been 
1 Introduction, p.9. 
2 L'Imaginaire, pp. 34 sqq. 
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and something new. In Les mot s, he discussed his attitude to death, and 
demonstrated its importance in life for him: 
"Menace d'abolition, chacun de mes amis se barricadait 
dans le present, decouvrait 1'irremplagable qualite de 
sa vie mortelle et se jugeait touchant, precieux, unique; 
chacun se plaisait a soi-meme; moi, le mort, je ne me 
plaisais pas: je me trouvais tres ordinaire, plus 
ennuyeux que le grand Corneille, et ma singularity 
de sujet n'offrait d'autre interet ^ mes yeux que de 
preparer le moment qui me changerait en objet. En 
^tais-je plus modeste? Non, mais plus ruse: je 
chargeais mes descendants de m'aimer a ma place; pour 
des hommes et des femmes qui n'etaient pas encore nes, 
j'aurais un jour du charme, un je ne sais quoi, je 
ferais leur bonheur. ( . . . ) Je regardais (ma vie) 
^ travers des yeux futurs et elle m'apparaissait comme 
une histoire touchante et merveilleuse que j'avais vecue 
pour tous, que nul, grace a moi, n'avait a revivre et qu'il 
suffirait de raconter. J'y mis une veritable frenesie: je 
choisis pour avenir un passe de grand mort et j'essayai de 
vivre h 1'envers"^. 
Thus Sartre indicated that from childhood he was interested in the lives 
of the dead, to the point where he chose to live his future through a 
famous dead man. 
To what extent this choice was manifest in his biographies is a 
point which will be discussed later. The fact is that Sartre wrote 
several studies, including Baudelaire, Saint-Genet, comedien et martyr, 
L'Idiot de la famille, and a brief life of Mallarm^. The notion of 
metamorphosis could be shown to be important to each of these writers, 
and not only because as writers they engaged in a process of transformation. 
Jean Genet, the subject of Saint-Gengt, comedien et martyr, was characterised 
3 Les mots, pp. 167-168. 
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by Bn'gid Brophy as a metamorphic writer par excellence - one who can 
transform a man into a centaur in mid-sentence. "Indeed," she continues, 
"Genet, down to his very grammar, plays on "the cardinal metamorphosis of 
'he' into 'she'^." Genet's views on the convertibility, the metamorphic 
indetermination of the sexes^, are well known, and his acknowledged 
homosexuality has scandalised many. Flaubert is suspected of having 
been a latent, if not a practising, homosexual. Sartre, as has been 
noted above, remarked on Flaubert's desire to be a woman. Through his 
own use of language and through his literary psychoanalysis, he also 
attempts to further substantiate his claim that Flaubert manifested 
feminine traits, in other words, that Flaubert, like Gen§t, was a 
metamorphic figure. The subject of another of Sartre's biographies, 
Baudelaire, wrote a poem which seemed to haunt Sartre. Its subject was 
L'Heautontimoroumgnos (the poem bears the same name and appears in 
Les Fleurs du Mai), a creature which Sartre introduced into Les mots 
and into L'Idiot de la famille. This creature was a mythical monster, 
exhibiting special characteristies: 
"Je suis la plaie et le couteau! 
Je suis le soufflet et la joue! 
Je suis les membres et la roue! 
Et la victime et le bourreau!" 
Thus this creature, too, was metamorphic. However, the interest in 
metamorphosis, in particular that demonstrated in La nausee and L^Imaginaire 
seemed to disappear as a result of Sartre's war experiences. He moved from 
the world of novelistic creation and the imaginary to the real world of 
4 Brigid Brophy, Preface to Elizabeth Smart, By Grand Central Station I sat 
down and wept, London, Panther, 1966, p. 12. 
5 Brophy, p. 13. 
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political action, and an interest in a different form of transformation 
appeared. 
At this time, Sartre was writing plays and renewing his interest in 
play-acting. The earlier fascination for metamorphosis as an undesired 
and uncontrollable transformation, was replaced by an interest based on 
the actor's transformation as he takes on a role or character. The 
importance of this shift is that the actor's transformation into his 
character is intentional, requiring training and discipline. Sartre 
extended this interest into the political and philosophical spheres 
through his insistence on the individual's duty to take responsibility 
for his own actions. 
In the early 1950's, as has been mentioned above^, Sartre began to 
draw a distinction between the 'acte' and the 'geste', between the real 
thing and the appearance of the real thing. Sartre puts forward an 
interesting argument on this point: 
"Genet says in Our Lady of the Flowers: 'If I were to have 
a play put on in which women had roles, I would demand that 
these roles be performed by adolescent boys, and I would 
bring this to the attention of the spectators by means of 
a placard, which would remain nailed to the right or left 
of the sets during the entire performance.' One might be 
tempted to explain this demand by Genet's taste for young 
boys. Nevertheless, this is not the essential reason. The 
truth of the matter is that Genet wishes from the very start 
to strike at the root of the apparent. No doubt an actress 
can play Solange, but what might be called 'de-realising' would 
not be radical, since there would be no need for her to play 
at being a woman. The softness of her flesh, the languid 
grace of her movements and the silvery tone of her voice 
6 A man perceived? p. 102. 
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are natural endowments. They constitute the substance 
that she would mold as she saw fit, so as to give it 
the appearance of Solange. Genet wishes this feminine 
stuff itself to become an appearance, the result of a 
make-believe. It is not Solange who is to be a 
theatrical illusion, but rather the woman Solange"^. 
Sartre makes the point here that it is necessary to distinguish between 
the person and the role to be portrayed. Erving Goffman, in Frame Analysis, 
a philosophical investigation into behaviour in the social context, comments 
on this®, draws a similar distinction between the person and the role, and 
adds a third term (and therefore a third dimension) - character. He 
defines his terms as follows: 
"I shall use the term 'role' as an equivalent to 
specialised capacity or function, (. . . ): the 
term 'person' will refer to the subject of a 
biography, the term 'part' or 'character' to a 
staged version"^, 
and goes on to remark that in everyday life, we are more often aware of 
an individual's role than of his biography. 
Sartre makes the individual responsible for his actions. He also 
believes that the individual is committed to his actions, and through 
them to other actions. Through any role he adopts, he is also expressing 
commitment and therefore should accept responsibility for actions 
committed in that role. Goffman also asks us to consider the matter 
of responsibi1ity: 
"When an individual performs a deed while actively engaged 
in a particular role and performs the deed by virtue of the 
role, what liability for the act does he carry away with him 
to times and places in which he is no longer active in that 
particular role?"^° 
7 J-P. Sartre, Introduction to Jean Genet, The maids and Deathwatch, Tr. 
Bernard Frechtman, New York, Grove Press, iyb4, pp. »-y. 
8 Erving Goffman, Frame analysis, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1975, p. 284. 
9 Ibid, p. 129. 
10 Ibid, p. 271. 
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Unfortunately, he seems to skirt around the issue. However, he does make 
a legalistic case for diminished responsibility, through 'impairment to 
will or rationality'. Furthermore, he implies here and elsewhere in the 
work, that society, that is other men, are more familiar with a man's role 
than with his person, and that to a large extent responsibility is vested 
in the role. Thus whereas Goffman tends to ignore the person at the centre 
of several roles, Sartre seems to virtually discount the influence of 
society in the playing of roles. 
That Sartre discounts the influence of society altogether is, of 
course, not true. He is all too aware of the way in which society labels 
men through their roles. He is at pains, at least from Baudelaire 
onwards, to remind us that man is a sham, that he is not what he seems^^. 
In Les mots, as noted previously, he repeatedly informs his reader that 
he, too, is a sham. Sham, 'imposture', contains more than merely the 
intention to delude an audience. On the one hand, Sartre repeatedly 
discussed the deliberate attempt to be someone else, or rather to appear 
in another role: 
"Je feignais d'etre un acteur feignant d'etre un heros"^^^ 
On the other hand, he seems to be taking words from the mouth of lago -
'I am not what I am'. Sartre himself has played many roles. From Sartre's 
warnings that man is a sham, the reader may be prompted to remember that 
whatever a person appears as, that is, whatever role he presents, that 
same person may in other circumstances present other roles. 
11 'Rappelons-nous ( . . . ) qu'un homme n'est jamais qu'une imposture', 
Baudelaire, p. 94. 
12 Les mots, p. 121. 
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In L' Idiot de la f a m H l e , Sartre has attempted to gather 
together all his roles. Thus he presents the reader with the political 
anthropologist, the philosopher, the novelist, the literary critic, the 
biographer: furthermore, he contrives to present these roles more or 
less simultaneously. At first the reader may be disoriented, in the same 
way that anyone may be disconcerted by the presentation of a number of 
roles and patterns of behaviour within a short space of time. The 
validity of each of Sartre's roles has been examined in the previous 
chapters of this study. Each aspect of L'Idiot de la famille has been 
seen as another attempt by Sartre to discover what one can know of a man. 
Since the work is a biography, the reader is presented with two approaches 
to the study on this point. Firstly, the approaches enable the reader to 
investigate Flaubert from a number of points of view, and thus have a 
deeper understanding of his character. Secondly, each approach, being 
the product of one of Sartre's 'roles', enables the reader to understand 
or evaluate the Sartre of that role. 
I have argued that Sartre's investigation is constructed in a complex 
way, analogous with the construction of a orism. That is to say that there 
are several facets, each of which reflects and refracts the light of the 
ideas contained, and that there is a core or centre, founded on the theory 
of the imaginary. Webster's Dictionary includes in its definition of 
prism/prismatic an indication of the use of 'prismatic' in relation to 
'book'. Thus a 'prismatic book' is one which is not only 'sharoly faceted, 
receiving light from many aspects', but it may also be said to 'refract the 
actual into the prophetic'. Through the construction of the work, the 
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reader may be aware of more than is actually presented by Sartre. 
Within Goffman's frame of reference, this may be the same as saying 
that we learn and understand the 'person'-by studying the various 
'roles' and analysing the gaps and discrepancies between them. The 
interaction between the facets of L'Idiot de la fami lie provides the 
reader with insight into a broader perspective, and leads to a greater 
comprehension. 
Sartre was concerned with the construction of L' Idiot de 1a famil1e, 
and was keen to remind the reader that he was dealing with a work of 
fiction. At the beginning of the study, he remarks "C'est une fable; 
je I'avoue"^^. The fact that he presents it as a work of fiction lends 
another dimension to the notion of transformation. A work of fantasy, 
for example, will bear the seeds of transformation within it; it will 
play with the reader's/viewer's perceptions, distorting even the most 
obvious fact. The Argentinian writer, Jorge Luis Borges, outlined the 
basic devices used in fantastic literature. He claimed that there were 
only four: the work within the work, the contamination of reality by 
dream, the voyage in time and the double^''. Each of these devices can 
be found in L'Idiot de la famille. Sartre attempts to take the reader 
with Flaubert through some of Flaubert's reading and writing experiences, 
and to give the reader both an insight into the mental processes which 
produced the work as well as setting out some of the actual writings. 
That Sartre contaminates reality by dream is difficult to substantiate; 
13 L'Idiot. I quote from memory. 
14 Jorge Luis Borges, Labyrinths, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970, p. 8. 
- 114 -
however, as has been mentioned earlier, he does contaminate reality by 
imagination. The voyage in time is definitely a device used in 
L'Idiot de la famil1e. For example, although the work is claimed to 
relate to Flaubert's life between 1821 and 1857, there are many allusions 
to the twentieth century, and to events in Sartre's lifetime. The 
references to Nazi war criminals is an example of this sort of anachronism. 
The fourth device, that of the double, is the one around which the chapter, 
A Man Perceived?, is based. What the reader finds in L'Idiot de la famille 
is perhaps not so much the intrusion of Sartre the author, but the 
presentation of a real double: Flaubert, in the 'person' of Sartre. 
The presentation of the double through L'Idiot de la famille may 
remind the reader of a sentence from Les mots: 
"Je choisis pour avenir un passe de grand mort et j'essayai 
de vivre a 1'envers"^^. 
Much of Sartre's writings was biographical; with the exception of Genet, 
the subjects of his biographies were already dead. The reader may infer 
that through these biographies, Sartre sought a life of his own, and 
although this is hardly obvious from the earlier works - except that a 
biographer always has some rapport with his subject - there is evidence 
to support a case for his desire to live through the life of Flaubert. 
"In the beginning of literature is the myth, and in the end as well." 
So wrote Borges in his Parable of Cervantes and the Quixote^^ Sartre 
15 Les mots, p. 168. 
16 Borges, p. 278. 
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believed that Truth and Myth were one and the same thing^^. He used 
this belief to provide the answer to L'Idiot de la famille's fundamental 
question - What can we know of a man? The short answer is that man is a 
sham. However, in this chapter I have attempted to explain the complexity 
of this seemingly simple statement, 
L'Idiot de 1a fami1le is, among other things, a study in transformation. 
The work itself is not what it seems - it is not just a biography, nor is 
it anthropology nor a novel. It is all of these simultaneously, each 
clearly definable; but it is more. The methods of investigation used 
demonstrate the influence of Marx and Marxist thought, as well as that 
of Freud and Freudian psychoanalysis-, there is also the existentialist 
method, and yet here too, it is not possible to accurately detail the 
methods used. The Flaubert who is subject of Sartre's study, is also 
not what one might expect. The character relates only in part to the 
generally accepted Flaubert, depicted in other biographies. This also 
emphasises Sartre's earlier statement that 'un homme n'est jamais qu'une 
imposture'. 
Man appears more of a sham if the reader considers the perspective 
offered on Sartre himself. He presents the various roles he has played, 
without any attempt to give one priority over the others; thus he is 
more than he seems at any one time. Furthermore, the central figure of 
L'Idiot de la familie seems to metamorphose before the reader's eyes. One 
is reminded once more of Franconay impersonating Chevalier. The central 
figure is now Flaubert, now Sartre, now an uncanny fusion of the two. 
17 Les mots, p. 75. 
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The importance of the theory of the imaginary in L'Idiot de 1a 
fatni 11 e has been discussed in previous chapters: each facet of the 
study seems to be based in the imaginary. If the study is considered a 
study in transformation, then there is no difficulty in regarding Sartre 
himself as the 'man' of the question, and in accepting that it is his 
truth which is being expounded in the work through the life of Flaubert. 
Sartre has given us important information towards a reinterpretation of 
his own life. Man has many facets: Sartre presents the reader with his 
many facets. In each, he is actively involved, committed to his various 
beliefs. Although it is impossible to draw any definitive conclusions 
about Sartre's life, since he has not yet committed the final act of 
death, it is possible to suggest such a reinterpretation. Between the 
presentation of Sartre's various roles in L'Idiot de la fami lie, Sartre 
the person can be discovered. The reader may conclude that Sartre himself 
is a metamorphic figure: Sartre the activist in the political world is, 
at one and the same time, Sartre the activist in the symbolic world. 
Death may give prominence to Sartre's theory of the imaginary, thus 
lending importance to his actions in the symbolic world, and casting 
doubt on the validity of his actions in the political world. This seems 
to be the implicit message of L'Idiot de 1a famille. 
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